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machines like the automobile and high technologies like nuclear
energy, hazard is ubiquitous and inevitable. Hence selective aver-
sion to certain risks, most particularly to the manmade risks of
advanced technologies, can prove to be counterproductive. Selec-
tive aversion might foreclose progressive new technologies that are,
despite their dangers, on balance beneficial. A world with vaccines
and nuclear power plants is not perfectly safe, for example, but
might be safer than a world without. In other words, though risk by
definition is costly, avoiding risk is costly as well.' It entails the costs
of controls and other risk-reduction measures, and at times the costs
of forgone benefits (a risky new technology might guard against even
more threatening natural hazards, such as disease; it might displace
the greater risks of a technology already in place, or produce units of
output at a lower cost than the existing technology, or both). So the
objective of risk management must be not the elimination of risk, but
rather the minimization of all risk-related costs.'
All of this sounds platitudinous, yet it happens to be extraordi-
narily controversial - especially in the case of "public risks," a
recently coined name for the distinctive hazards of high-tech times.
Public risks have been defined as manmade "threats to human health
or safety that are centrally or mass-produced, broadly distributed,
and largely outside the individual risk bearer's direct understanding
and control."3 "Private risks," in contrast, are either of natural ori-
I Technically speaking, "risk" refers only to the probability of an event, with
something like "gravity" designating its possible adverse consequences. Moreover,
"risk" has classically referred only to probabilities that can be precisely estimated, all
other instances being consigned to the realm of "uncertainty." See, e.g., F. KNIGHT,
RIsK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19-20, 197-232 (1921) (arguing that the crucial
difference between iisk and uncertainty is that the former is "measurable" while the
latter is "immeasurable"). Following current practice, we ignore the foregoing
distinctions and use risk in the technical sense to mean an expected value arrived at by
multiplying the potential adverse consequences of an event - loosely, its costs - by
the probability that the event will occur (the probability might be objective or
subjective). Later, we introduce and consider the meaning of risk in the popular sense.
See infra notes 124-75 and accompanying text.
2 The objective, in other words, is to minimize the sum of the costs of risk and
the costs of avoiding risk. Cf G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970)
(stating "as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum
of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents"). While risk cost
minimization is an important end of risk management, it is not the only one. For
example, the distribution of risk - demographically, spatially, and temporally - also
has to be considered, partly for reasons ofjustice and partly because distribution has
a bearing on the measure of risk costs that one might hope to minimize. See infra
notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
3 Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985).
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gin or, if manmade, produced in relatively discrete units, with local
impacts more or less subject to personal control. In these terms,
then, disease is a natural private risk; the hazards of commonplace
artifacts like automobiles and wood stoves are manmade private
risks. Public risks, on the other hand, originate in new or complex
technologies like chemical additives, recombinant DNA, mass-pro-
duced vaccines, and nuclear power plants.4
The public-private distinction is hardly perfect (consider the
pollution pouring into the atmosphere from thousands of
automobiles, or from thousands of wood stoves), but it is useful
enough, especially for purposes of illuminating a currently important
controversy that centers on the idea of cost minimization in the risk
context.5 Public risks are precisely the risks that have recently cap-
tured the attention of the legal community and the world at large, in
no small part because they give rise to such novel problems for law-
yers and such grave apprehensions among lay people. Public risks
have moved the legal system to relax doctrines - regarding, for
example, standards of causation and culpability, burdens of proof,
sharing of liability - that were designed to deal with the private risks
that once dominated the landscape. And public risks have moved lay
people to intensify their demands for risk control measures. These
developments suggest that public risks are subject to especially harsh
treatment, yet such treatment might often be contrary to minimizing
the sum of all risk-related costs. If some public risks, whatever their
dangers, are in fact safer or otherwise more beneficial than the risks
they would displace, then cost minimization requires open-minded
efforts to encourage many of the very technological threats that cur-
rent legal and popular opinion would instead deter. As a conse-
quence, the question of what to do about public risk has become a
subject of considerable (and sometimes heated) debate.
That debate is our concern throughout all that follows. We
begin in Part I with a summary of the contending views in the ongo-
ing argument about public risk, giving particular attention to two
important points of contention. The first of these has to do with atti-
tudes. The general public, and to some degree the legal system as
well, have a particular aversion to public risk. Is this justified? The
4 See id. at 277-78.
5 Huber acknowledges that the public-private distinction is a simplification:
"[R]isk distributions come in a continuum, not in two neat categories." Id. at 278
n.4. While this is obviously true enough, the distinction nevertheless nicely captures
the essence of the risk debate that concerns us in this Article. Those interested in
refining the categories should find some suggestions implicit in our discussion.
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second point of contention, intimately related to the first, has to do
with institutions, and especially with judicial versus administrative
rule. At present, the courts are playing an important part in shaping
the legal response to public risk. Is this sensible?
According to one powerfully stated outlook - an outlook that
runs directly against the grain of prevailing sentiments - the answer
to each of the foregoing questions is a firm "no." Our actions
increase, rather than minimize, risk costs. We worry too much about
public risks and not enough about private ones. We control public
risks with a haphazard mix of market, judicial, administrative, and
legislative measures that too often proceed in the wrong direction,
without coordination, and with too little reliance on agencies and too
much on courts. The courts especially are said to pander to unin-
formed and irrational risk attitudes; their decisions show a myopic
bias against new technology and in favor of its victims. New or com-
plex technologies are subjected to a degree of scrutiny that riskier
but established (often private) risk sources never underwent and
could not survive. As a result, we have too much private risk and too
little public risk, not more safety but less.6
Some of the critics advancing this line call for a reduction of the
judicial role in risk assessment and management, and for more reli-
ance on administrative agencies. Agencies, they argue, have more
expertise, are more objective and rational, can be more attentive to
the net effects of technological advance. Courts, they conclude,
should defer to them.
This is the set of views that we call into question here. After
sketching the lines of debate in Part I, we turn in Part II to a prefa-
tory discussion about why risk has to be regulated at all, and under
what circumstances. Part III and much of Part IV then address the
debate about institutions, taking up courts and agencies in turn. In
Part III, we model the litigation process in a way that suggests how
courts might well be managing risk much more productively than
one would at first suppose. [n Part IV, we pursue a similar model to
show why agencies might fall far short of what is claimed on their
behalf, were the courts to be more deferential. A significant portion
6 See id. at 295-99, 309-11; Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1025, 1073-75 (1983); see also H. KAHN, W. BROWN & L. MARTEL, THE NEXT
200 YEARS: A SCENARIO FOR AMERICA AND THE WORLD 150-51, 163-66 (1976)
(arguing that, on balance, technological advances should not be discouraged, but
rather fostered with prudence and caution); A. WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY
48-50 (1988) (arguing that efforts to reduce risk often generate and increase
collateral risks).
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of the agency discussion is devoted to attitudes about risk. The
question of attitudes has been begged in the legal debate about pub-
lic risk, yet the topic is of fundamental importance: attitudes about
risk - about the meanings of risk - have much to do with choosing or
devising the right management institutions.
The comparative analysis of courts and agencies in Parts III and
IV leads us to conclude that ambitious proposals to increase the
scope of agency authority at the expense of judicial scrutiny are
remarkably premature.7 We stop short of saying that the present
institutional arrangements are, however imperfect, the best we can
hope for given current understanding. We insist, though, that those
critics who would alter existing arrangements through sweeping
delegations to experts and bureaucrats have utterly failed to carry a
reasonable burden of proof. A careful comparative assessment sim-
ply raises too many doubts about the wisdom of wholesale abdication
to technocratic rule.
Part V underscores this conclusion with some speculation about
the larger implications of technocracy in a democratic system. Our
concerns in this respect lead us to consider an alternative and cur-
rently popular view that public risk should be managed through one
or another version of participatory democracy. We end up being as
skeptical here as we are about technocracy. Obviously, then, we
think that much ground has still to be covered before anyone can
confidently come forth with ambitious programs for risk assessment
and management. As we see it, the public risk debate presently rests
at the inside edge of a vast and expanding universe, an unsurprising
thing given that risk has only recently been highlighted on social and
legal agendas. The entire topic - its attitudinal, institutional, and
scientific aspects - is still so shrouded with uncertainty that it is diffi-
cult to be confident about anything other than the need for more
information and more argument. What we hope to do is move mat-
ters forward by bringing into view some considerations that must
(but thus far do not) figure in the ongoing debate.
7 We do not deny that there are advantages to relying chiefly on administrative
agencies, rather than courts, in particular situations. For example, administrative
regulation might be superior to adjudication where injurers are unable to pay for all
the harm they cause, thus making the threat of ex post damages insufficient to induce
optimal levels of care. See Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357, 360-61 (1984).
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I. LINES OF DEBATE8
Understand that we are sketching here not our own views, but
the views of those on the two sides of the debate about public risk.
As mentioned above, part oF the debate is about attitudes, and part
about institutions.
A. The Debate About Attitudes
The dominant popular attitude seems to reflect a strong aver-
sion to public risk, as opposed to private risk alternatives (and in
some instances as opposed to older, conventional or established,
public risk sources). This point of view is revealed by contrasting
popular reactions in various risk settings. People protest when
required to fasten seatbelts in their cars, yet they obey orders to
buckle up in commercial aircraft; they object to mandatory vaccina-
tion but insist on a right of access to incompletely tested miracle
cures; they oppose the state's application of a pesticide only to apply
the same chemical themselves under uncontrolled conditions; they
condemn nuclear power plants but not conventional ones, and wel-
come alternative decentralized energy sources; they fear additives
alleged to be carcinogenic yet consume natural foods that contain
carcinogens. In short, they oppose the new, the high, and the cen-
tralized; they regard public risk as especially dangerous.
A considerable number of observers regard this popular mind-
set as remarkably odd. They argue that public risk sources of pro-
duction and consumption, new sources in particular, are generally
safer than conventional public and private alternatives - safer, at
least, in terms of expected mortality and morbidity. And it is true
that, measured in these terms,9 commercial air travel is safer than travel
8 Our summary of the risk debate encapsulates the discussion in Huber, supra
note 3, at 280-305, where interested readers will find abundant documentation.
Beyond this, much of what we say throughout the pages that follow is framed with
reference to Mr. Huber's discussion. He argues with considerable passion on behalf
of public risk, and takes particular issue with two "eloquent spokesmen" in the risk
debate. See id. at 277 n.1 (citing Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984); Yellin,
High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1981)). We focus on Huber in a similar spirit because, among
other reasons, he draws together a number of observations about public risk that are
related but have nevertheless appeared only piecemeal in the larger literature
sampled in our discussion.
9 Measured, that is, in terms of the technical sense of risk. See supra note I.
Whether new public risks are also generally safer when measured in terms of the
popular sense of risk, terms that go beyond mortality and morbidity, and whether the
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by automobile, vaccination less risky than no vaccination (despite
side effects and the occasional vaccination-induced disease), public
pest control programs less hazardous than private application. In
the same terms, conventional centralized power plants are probably
safer than wood stoves, perhaps safer than alternative decentralized
power sources (such as solar), perhaps safer, even, than energy con-
servation (insulation is not free of danger)'" - with nuclear power
the least risky of all in the view of a considerable number of experts.
There are artificial food additives that, though toxic themselves, may
more than pay their way by inhibiting the formation of natural car-
cinogens. Public water supplies are said to be safer, usually, than
private wells; saccharin is said to be safer than sugar for consumers
suffering from diabetes or obesity, and the newer sugar substitutes,
aspartame and cyclamate, arguably safer yet.
A way of summarizing the foregoing viewpoint, which figuies
very prominently in the public risk debate, is to say that "(1) newer is
generally safer than older, and (2) public is generally safer than pri-
vate."" If these statements are correct, then the public's aversion to
public risk - an aversion championed by those on the opposite side
of the argument - is generally unjustified, and inconsistent with the
objective of minimizing total risk costs.
B. The Debate About Institutions
An influential segment of the legal community - many trial law-
yers, some scholars and judges, and no doubt a number of legislators
- has embraced the public's aversion to public risk. The result is a
series of measures, some only proposed but others realized, to sub-
ject public risk sources to singular constraints, whether by way of
popular sense of risk is acceptably rational, are important questions that we consider
later. See infra notes 124-75 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Gulf South Insulation v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacating ruling by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission because the Commission failed to meet the "substantial
evidence" requirement before issuing a ban on formaldehyde foam insulation);
Borden, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 736-37, 448 N.E.2d
367, 385-86 (1983) (allowing the introduction of evidence supporting contention
that insulation contained a known carcinogen), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
I1 These two heuristics, or rules of thumb, are Huber's. See Huber, supra note 3,
at 307. He attributes the relative safety of new public risks to technological advance
and to mass production (itself a technological advance). See id. at 295-304. Huber's
generalizations identify him as an adherent to a viewpoint we have elsewhere
described as technological optimism. See Krier & Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for
Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
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increased legislative and administrative regulation, 2 enhanced judi-
cial review of suspect regulatory activity, 13 or expanded liability in
tort. 14 While all these measures are regarded with consternation by
people who see public risk as relatively benign, the critical literature
has focused particularly on moves to enlarge the role of the judiciary
at the expense of administrative agencies.
Essentially, two concerns come into play, the first growing
directly out of the debate about attitudes described above, the sec-
ond leading explicitly into the debate about institutions described
here. First, if adjudication is dominated by judges and juries who
share the general public's aversion to public risk and therefore sad-
dle public risk sources with special burdens (whether through more
extensive tort liability or more intensive judicial review of agency
decisions), then we might well end up with more, not less, hazard.
Novel public risk sources will be made to bear costs that existing risk
12 See, e.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-516, § 2, 86 Stat. 979 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y (1988)); Nuclear Power
and Waste Disposal Voter Approval and Legislative Certification Act, 1982 Mass.
Acts. ch. 502 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164 app. §§ 3-1 to -9 (West
Supp. 1989)); Massachusetts Pesticide Control Act, 1978 Mass. Acts ch. 3 (codified at
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 132B §§ 6a-14 (West Supp. 1989)); Ginsberg & Weiss,
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 928-40
(198 1) (proposing legislative creation of a compensation fund maintained by taxes on
industries generating hazardous wastes).
3 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1150-52
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (granting review of administrative action despite plaintiff's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies); Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to defer to
administrative agency's statutory interpretation); Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224, 229-31
(6th Cir. 1986) (vacating an EPA ruling because of agency's failure to validate
theoretical pollution model with actual on-site testing); Furrow, Governing Science:
Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1436-65 (1983) (proposing
that courts provide injunctive relief when administrative agencies lag in their
regulatory efforts); Yellin, supra note 8, at 553-60 (proposing closer judicial review of
agency approval of broad new technological initiatives); see also Huber, supra note 3,
at 283-84 (citing the Yellin and Rosenberg proposals concerning judicial
intervention).
14 See, e.g., cases cited first paragraph infra note 52; see also Bohrer, Fear and
Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Uncertainty, and Emotional Distress,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 83, 122-28 (proposing tort liability for psychic distress inflicted by
technological developments); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 866-68 (proposing a
relaxed burden of proof, and liability for risk itself - as opposed to requiring
materialized injury - in cases of mass exposure to technological threats). See
generally Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 799-800
(1985) (agreeing that courts, in cases involving exposure to toxic substances, are
moving away from the traditional tort law rules of causation); Huber, supra note 3, at
284-85; Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 779 (1985).
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sources escape, and this might perversely put risk-reducing technol-
ogies at a competitive disadvantage. Production and consumption
will tend to shift away from public risk and in the direction of alterna-
tives that are, according to this critique, commonly more
dangerous. 1
5
This suggests, second, that courts simply should not play a sig-
nificant role in public risk assessment and management, partly
because they share the uninformed popular mindset and partly
because they are inept assessors and managers in any event. If the
goal is to minimize net risk costs, then the way to proceed is through
an approach that is self-consciously comparative and aggregative in
terms of the costs introduced and those removed by any new tech-
nology. Ideally, risk management institutions should be free of pre-
disposition and single-mindedness, capable of understanding and
assessing not only the risk-generating but also the risk-reducing fea-
tures of particular innovations, technically sophisticated, and analyti-
cally adept. Courts, the argument goes on, can hardly come close.
Adjudication is dominated by judges and jurors who are institution-
ally and psychologically biased, systematically partial to injured
plaintiffs and to the status quo, and indiscriminately inclined to reach
into the deep pockets of defendants. The plaintiffs' bar, more inter-
ested in personal gain than in advancing social welfare, aggravates
the problem. Andjudicial intervention is a poor method of risk man-
agement in any event, because it proceeds episodically rather than
continuously, in response to the "luridness" of events,' 6 and without
regard to much relevant data. The data would only be puzzling any-
way, because the courts - whether actively overseeing administra-
tive actions to regulate risk, or regulating on their own through the
tort system - are ill equipped to amass and process the information
crucial to a felicitous risk calculus.
Concisely summarized, the critics argue that courts and juries
have "little capacity to make risk choices wisely."' 7 Wittingly or not,
15 See Huber, supra note 3, at 291-93, 314-16. See generally P. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); J. Calfee & P. Rubin,
Liability for Reducing Risk 4, 16-20, 27-28 (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 4, 1987).
For a forerunner of the argument, see Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict
Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036,
1068-89 (1980).
16 See Huber, supra note 3, at 317.
17 Id. at 319. See generally Elliott, supra note 14, at 803 (stating that "there is...
reason to believe that other institutions are better equipped than lay courts and juries
to assess risks"); Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial
Competence, 214 Sc. 1211, 1215 (1981) (noting the need for apolitical, as opposed to a
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they hamper progressive new technologies, such "that our gross out-
put of public risk steadily declines, but our aggregate consumption
of risk begins to increase."' 8 The solution to the problem is thought
to be straightforward. Public risk cannot be left entirely to the disci-
pline of market forces; 19 it can, however, be consigned to an institu-
tion with comparative advantages when it comes to risk regulation -
"expert administrative agencies."20  Agencies, though hardly per-
fect, are (the claim runs) vastly superior to courts. They can engage
in systematic inquiries, gather and deploy technical resources, per-
form comparative assessments; they can provide the informed and
open-minded public perspective - on risks averted as well as those
incurred - that risk regulation requires.2 1 Courts, the argument
concludes, "should defer to the experts. ' '22
II. RISK PRODUCTION AND RISK REDUCTION
We review here some of the market imperfections that suggest a
need for intervention (whether through courts or agencies or both)
in the case of public risk. Review should help us understand what it
is that regulation aims to cure.23 To begin, consider the incentives
judicial, role in scientilic and technical areas); Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk
Management, 16 ENvrTL. L. REP. 10,208 (1986) (describing judicial shortcomings
relative to effectively functioning administrative agencies). Cf Henderson, Judicial
Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1531, 1531-40 (1973) (discussing the limitations of courts in establishing
product safety standards).
18 Huber, supra note 3, at 279.
19 The reasons for this, all of them obvious enough, are summarized infra notes
23-43 and accompanying text.
20 Huber, supra note 3, at 329; see also Elliott, supra note 14, at 803 (stating that
"[a]dministrative agencies are superior to judges in making risk assessment decisions
that turn on scientific and technical evidence"); Stewart, supra note 17, at 10,209
(noting that "primary responsibility for managing risk must be given to
administrative agencies").
21 See Huber, supra note 3, al. 331-32; Stewart, supra note 17, at 10,209. Huber
argues that the courts are incapable of considering risks averted because litigation
brings forth only the victims of public risks, and not the beneficiaries. He
acknowledges that defendants would be happy to act as surrogates for the
beneficiaries, but believes that "industry serves very poorly in this representative
capacity, for the obvious reason that it has every incentive to claim risk-reducing
benefits whether or not they exist." Huber, supra note 3, at 332. To be sure. But
there is a difference between merely claiming benefits and actually giving reliable
evidence for them. Defendants would have strong incentives to develop concrete
evidence of benefits that would provide the courts with useful information about risks
averted.
22 Huber, supra note 3, at 333. They should do so, that is, in cases of public risk.
Huber does accept that courts are effective in the private risk setting. See id. at 331.
23 We review market imperfections only to suggest the motivations for and
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of producers and consumers (in each case, of products and of risks)
to engage in behavior tending to minimize the costs of public risks
absent any regulatory forces other than those imposed by the mar-
ket. The point of the inquiry should be obvious. If the risk market is
nicely self-regulating, neither judicial nor administrative oversight is
necessary. Even when the market falls short of the ideal, it might
nevertheless succeed in controlling some discrete instances or
amounts of risk. To that extent regulation is again unnecessary, at
least from the standpoint of cost minimization.24 Regulation
belongs most clearly in the domain that remains, the size and shape
of which can be roughly gathered from a sketch of the risk market.
We assume that firms producing public risks try to act in a
rational, profit-maximizing manner. On this assumption, they are
motivated .to reduce the risks of their products or production
processes only when it is in their self-interest to do so, regardless of
a particular measure's potential social benefits. It follows, since risk
reduction measures are typically costly, that producers will have little
interest in them unless they generate gains that producers can realize
themselves.
2 5
These observations suggest some important instances in which
the engine of egoism (including the egoism of consumers and
employees, whom we also assume to be self-interested) might have
targets of interventionist moves, rather than to justify the moves themselves. A
central point throughout our Article is that all institutions are imperfect, the
implication being that casually substituting one institution for another may make
matters worse rather than better. Given this, we should logically undertake to
compare market imperfections to the faults of competing regulatory institutions, in
an effort to determine whether leaving matters to the market might on occasion be
best - or least bad - after all. Yet we forgo such an interesting and ambitious
comparative-imperfection exercise, not because we think its outcome would be
obvious, but rather because we regard it as sufficiently non-obvious that it is better
left to another article. For now, we limit our attention to a comparative analysis of
courts and agencies in the realm of public risk.
24 This assumes that the government could not control the same discrete
instances or amounts of risk at less cost than the market; if it could, regulation would
be appropriate on cost-minimization grounds even though the market is coping to
some degree. It also assumes (as does this entire part of the Article) that risk
minimization is the dominant regulatory objective. In fact, of course, there may be
other considerations that justify intervention even when the market is doing a good
job at minimizing risk costs - considerations having to do, for example, with the way
market forces distribute risk costs. See supra note 2.
25 Theoretically, we suppose, firms could be motivated by something other than
self-interest: they might be moved by altruism to implement measures that reduce
risk at considerable cost but no net benefit to themselves. But the argument from
altruism is, as we said, surely theoretical, precisely because our assumptions about
the producer mind-set are such realistic ones.
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sufficient horsepower to drive the market to near-optimal levels of
public risk. For example, in a competitive market serving well-
informed consumers with the means to pay (if they wish) for
increased safety, recalcitrant producers will lose sales and profits to
competitors who respond to consumer demand.26 Another familiar
instance is that of risky job sites. In competitive labor markets with
workers aware of employment risks and responsive to them, employ-
ers offering dangerous work conditions will lose their best employ-
ees to competing firms that offer safer sites or pay offsetting wage
premiums. Competitive pressures, then, can be expected to stimu-
late all firms, and their employees, to take appropriate risk reduction
steps.27
The transactional nature of these instances helps to explain their
dynamics. 28 Productive transactions, though, require good informa-
tion processing, a consideration that limits considerably the force of
our examples in many instances of public risk. Commonly, producer
firms simply won't have good information about risk (often because,
as we shall see, they are not stimulated to have it) or, if they do,
won't act on it or share it with typically underinformed consumers
and employees. 29 To be sure, our examples suggest that firms with
26 A variant of this example pictures well-known risks that consumers can
choose to tolerate or avoid on their own, in either case at a cost less than that of
producer avoidance; here consumers will rightly not wish for a safer product.
27 This, at least, is the typical economics perspective. Literature from other
disciplines suggests that job conditions and job selection are not particularly
sensitive to the risk/wage premium mix. See, e.g., D. NELKIN & M. BROWN, WORKERS
AT RISK 178-83 (1984) (describing how workers anxious about the pervasive presence
of chemical risks in the workplace nevertheless believed that they had no genuine
opportunity to choose safer employment); Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms,
17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54, 62 (1988) (discussing how the market norms of cost-benefit
analysis contradict the norms and values that shape workers' perspectives on risks to
life and health).
28 Because firms are in a bargaining - a transactional - relationship with
employees and customers, they have incentives to take cost-justified safety
precautions: employees and customers will compensate for the precautions by
accepting lower wages, or paying higher prices, in exchange for enhanced safety. But
when transactions do not take place (say with bystanders, because of high transaction
costs), the firms' incentives would essentially disappear. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 152-54 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing industry customs regarding safety
in transactional and nontransactional settings). But see supra note 27; ii!fra notes 29,
33 & 36.
29 See Felstiner & Seigelman, Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for Latent
Injuries, 11 LAW & POL'y 309, 317, 319-20 (1989) (reviewing evidence that firms
seldom make.comprehensive efforts to inform employees ofjob risks, and sometimes
conceal information or take steps to see that information is not developed. For
instance, "[iun the asbestos context, the manufacturers had the information [about
job risk] and aggressively concealed it from exposed workers").
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an earned reputation for safety can enjoy competitive advantages in
product and labor markets. But certain distinctive characteristics of
public risks tend to dampen the incentives otherwise created by rep-
utation and profit concerns. Many public risks are latent in their
materialization. Adverse effects do not appear until long after expo-
sure.30 In addition, public risks are often diffuse in their impact,
spread over many victims, so the costs to any one victim might be
small even though the aggregate cost to the total victim population is
very large.3' Similarly, public risks are by definition probabilistic,
and the likelihood that exposure will lead to adverse effects is often
remote.32 The effects themselves might be of dramatic dimension,
should they occur, but by virtue of low probabilities their expected
costs are nevertheless negligible.
These characteristics skew the incentives of presumably self-
interested producers and consumers of public risks. Even assuming
some knowledge of risks, for example, consumers (including con-
sumers ofjobs - employees) and producers alike will generally dis-
count the information because of long latency, low probability, or
both. Where latency periods exceed ten to fifteen years, discounting
effectively means ignoring the risk altogether.3" Where probabilities
are low, actors commonly (if inappropriately) ignore potential conse-
quences, notwithstanding their likely magnitude should they materi-
alize.3 4 And diffuse effects are, on an individual basis, usually small
to begin with, and thus of little interest. For any or all of these rea-
30 Latency may also be a feature of some private risks, such as medical
malpractice, but it tends to exist systematically in the case of public risks. See, e.g.,
Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 213
(1978) (discussing characteristics of environmental risk).
31 See Huber, supra note 3, at 277 (noting the broad distribution of public risks);
Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons from a "Study" Council, 23 STAN. L. REv.
623, 664 (1971) (noting the breadth and diffusion of environmental risks).
32 See, e.g., Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1228 (1987).
33 The impact of latency on the incentive to take safety precautions is reviewed
in FeIstiner & Siegelman, supra note 29.
The standard formula for discounting a dollar amount to its present value is $x/
(I +r)" (where r = a stated interest rate and n = the number of periods during which
the interest rate is earned). Assume a .01 probability that an event will occur in 10
years and that, if it does, there will be a loss of $100,000,000. The expected value of
the loss is $1,000,000 in 10 years. The present (discounted) value of that loss at an
interest rate of 5 percent is $615,000; at 10 percent it is $385,000. If the event will
materialize, if at all, only in 20 years, then the present value figures are $375,000 and
$150,000 for 5 and 10 percent respectively.
34 See D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 73-75 (1984) (discussing error inherent
in ignoring small chances); Shrader-Frechette, Parfit and Mistakes in Moral Mathematics,
98 ETHICS 50, 54-55 (1987) (noting also the difficulty in assessing the causation of
consequences).
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sons, patterns of consumption are unlikely to be duly influenced by
the presence of risk, so risk producers will receive misleadingly
muted market signals. 35
The foregoing considerations are exacerbated where (as is
likely) self-interested managers have incentives to make decisions
that diverge from the actual interests of their firm. Even where man-
agers of risk-producing firms are aware that possible calamity lies
ahead, they still might not be sufficiently wary. The decision to dis-
cover and address possible long-term risks requires that costs be
incurred in the short term, and managers with an interest in profits
now will be disinclined to dedicate firm resources to programs the
benefits of which will accrue to the firm, if at all, only in the distant
future. Even managers who extend the time horizon by plotting the
value of their remaining careers can be expected to discount, per-
haps even disregard, risks with long latency periods. The lag
between cause and effect shelters managers from the consequences
of their decisions: evidence disappears, or the managers do.36
The systematic tendency to resolve uncertainty in the direction
of insufficient risk avoidance is especially acute in those instances
where benefits consist of the nonappearance of a problem. Imagine,
for example, a manager with sufficient resources to invest in either of
two ventures, but not both. The first venture bears a .1 probability
of increasing next year's profits by $10 million. The second is
expected, with the same probability, to avoid distant losses from
injuries by an amount presently valued at something more than $10
million.3 7 A desire for tangible and relatively quick indicia of success
will incline the manager to pursue the former strategy, even if the
latter has a higher expected value, simply because the manager can't
35 See Henderson, supra note 15, at 1037.
36 On the short time horizon of corporate decision making, see Felstiner &
Siegelman, supra note 29, at 309-12; Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to
Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1980, at 67; Henderson, Product Liability
and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765,
781-82 (1983); Robinson, supra note 14, at 784-85. If the same short-term bias
pervades the management class, then there is no reason to suppose that the market
for managers will solve the problem. Even if manager responses to risk were
heterogeneous, it is unlikely that managers would be selected primarily for their skill
in handling remote, distant risks, rather than for their skill in conducting more
common business affairs.
37 Since we are considering the incentives of risk producers and consumers in
the absence of any regulatory forces (such as tort liability) other than those provided
by the market, see supra text following note 23, we simply assume that the injury losses
would be brought to bear on the manager's firm through contractual provisions, loss
of reputation and business, and so forth.
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demonstrate that she triggered a benefit by arranging that something
bad won't eventually happen. This incentive to pursue tangible
gains, rather than to avoid ethereal losses, may become greater as
the relative certainty of the former increases, notwithstanding that
the expected value of the two options is equal. Suppose that the first
venture in our example is regarded as almost certain to increase
profits by $1 million, while the second venture would avoid injury
losses totaling $100 million were they to materialize, but the
probability of materialization is only .01. The manager will now be
even more tempted to pursue the first strategy, because certain and
demonstrable gains are likely to enhance her standing in the firm
more than would the tenuous avoidance of losses.3 8
The distorting incentives arising from diffuseness, latency, and
low probability, troublesome as they are, would be less so were
effects reversible once they materialized. 9 Yet one of the most
sobering characteristics of modern-day public risks is the perma-
nence of their effects.40 Irreversibility forecloses the benefits of
learning by trial-and-error, and hence correction by that means; tre-
mendously important information, arising from events, is rendered
virtually useless.4" It is most painfully useless in the case, again prev-
alent in public risks, of zero-infinity problems - those with a small
probability (approaching zero) of ever eventuating, but with cata-
strophic consequences (approaching infinity) if they do.4 2
The point of this discussion is that the risk market can fail even
when risk transactions are possible. The market contains an ill-
defined domain that calls for external control of some sort. The
domain enlarges extraordinarily when we step outside the world of
transactions, and hence out of ordinary markets. Risk is commonly
38 On this "certainty effect," see Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265-66 (1979).
39 Reversibility here means not simply that the act of undoing is possible, but
also affordable.
40 See Page, supra note 30, at 214.
41 Useless, at least, as to correcting the irreversible consequences; the
information might still prove useful regarding future events.
42 See Page, supra note 30, at 211. Catastrophic risks pose the additional
problem that many victims will likely not be compensated by risk producers, since
liability might easily exceed the total value of the offending firm. See Shavell, The
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 45 (1986) (suggesting that firms will
ignore risks that create potential liability greater than the assets of the firm); L.
Kornhauser & R. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Partially Insolvent Actors,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1990); see also Shavell, supra note 7, at 360-61
(concerning the advantage of administrative regulation relative to judicial regulation
in the instance of a judgment-proof defendant).
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produced and consumed not just as product but also as by-product.
X can choose whether or not to purchase the risky widget of Y, but
this isn't so as to Y's (or Z'!) risky pollution. E, who has chosen on
informed and compensated terms to work for F, can't bargain with
all those other firms for whom she doesn't work but who neverthe-
less subject her to the costs of risk. Yet without such transactions,
risk producers receive no signals to inform their self-interested
behavior - absent intervention from outside the market. This is the
familiar world of external costs, the part of the risk domain most
likely to benefit from measured controls.4 3
III. RISK, COURTS, AND LAWYERS
Many of the public risks that figure so prominently in the ongo-
ing debate are simply the most recent generation of environmental
problems.44 It should not be surprising, then, that conventional
analysis in environmental law anticipated by several decades some of
the argument about judicial strengths and shortcomings in the man-
agement of public risk. Yet, despite the fact that much of the under-
lying reasoning has held constant over the years, the conclusions
reached in the early literature are exactly contrary to those drawn by
the courts' new generation of critics.
For example, Professor N. William Hines, in one of the earliest
articles to address the matter, considered in 1966 some of the rea-
sons why public risk problems cannot be capably managed through
private lawsuits.45 One "fundamental difficulty," Hines wrote, "is
the inherent inability of courts to deal efficiently with issues of a sci-
entifically complex nature. [The evidence involved] is often highly
technical and next to impossible for even the most conscientious and
alert judge or layman to assimilate and evaluate." 4 6 Moreover,
"court action is entirely too fortuitous an event to serve as the basis
for a reliable ... control program. [And courts lack the] expertise,
[the] capacity to plan ahead, [and] the ability to administer a flexible
program"4 7 that are essential to effective regulation. "Finally, and
43 But see supra note 23.
44 See Page, supra note 30, at 207 (referring to a "new type of environmental
problem").
45 See Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52 IowA L.
REV. 186, 196-201 (1966).
46 Id. at 199.
47 Id. at 200.
RISK, COURTS, AND AGENCIES
perhaps of most importance, the adversary system ... does not ade-
quately assure representation of the public interest in... control. ' '48
These, of course, are precisely the points we hear echoed today,
but in support of a view strikingly different from the one developed
earlier by Hines. Those who now oppose judicial control of public
risk contend that the courts deter public risk too much;41 Hines
found them incapable of deterring enough. He asked a question that
can be generalized to encompass any public risk: do private lawsuits
provide "sufficient restraintto keep water pollution within tolerable
bounds?"'  His answer was "a categorical no."'"
It is a simple matter to account for this striking difference in out-
look. The contemporary critique is based on various expedients
thought to favor public risk victims unduly - such as the relaxed
burdens of proof regarding injury or causation that one finds devel-
oped in some recent public risk cases 52 - and argues that judicial
48 Id. at 201.
49 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
5o Hines, supra note 45, at 197.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 758-59
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (involving court's approval of class action settlement despite
difficulty in proving causation), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987); Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that plaintiff need not disprove every possible ground of
causation in order to recover for injuries arising from use of DPT vaccine), aft'd, 411
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100,
1104-08 (D.C. 1986) (admitting expert testimony to the effect that Bendectin
produced by defendant was cause of plaintiff's injuries, despite the fact that no single
study alone would support such a conclusion); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co., 73 N.Y.2d
487, 511-12, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950 (1989) (holding market
share theory to be appropriate basis for plaintiffs' recovery for injuries resulting from
use of DES during pregnancy), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 600-06, 615-17, 689 P.2d 368, 380-82, 388 (1984)
(en banc) (allowing plaintiff's recovery on modified market share theory).
Before too readily concluding that cases like the foregoing demonstrate a firm
pro-plaintiff bias in public risk litigation, one should note the substantial (and
perhaps increasing) number of cases that cut in the opposite direction. There are,
for example, recent decisions suggesting some antipathy to the liberal causation
theories that followed the market share liability theory developed in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-
46 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding insufficient causal link
between Bendectin and birth defects), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989); Lynch v.
Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding studies
of chemical "analogous" to Bendectin to be insufficient proof of a causal link
between Bendectin and birth defects); Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420,
422-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding summary judgment for defendant and rejecting
offer of expert testimony of causal relationship); Hull v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
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shortcomings aggravate the undesirable effects of these doctrinal
shifts. Hines also considered the shortcomings of courts to be aggra-
vating, but in the opposite direction: they intensify unwarranted
impediments to successful victim litigation. Surveying the tort sys-
tem (primarily nuisance doctrine), Hines found it to be hostile to
potential plaintiffs. It requires material harm, restricts standing, lim-
its liability to "unreasonable" conduct defined on narrow utilitarian
grounds, provides "overly solicitous" defenses, and puts a heavy
burden of proof on plaintiffs - especially regarding who caused
harm, and to what degree, in cases involving multiple defendants. 53
Considerations like these are examples of what we call process
bias, denoting factors that work systematically for or against the
interests of plaintiffs once their public risk claims reach the courtroom.
Observers like Hines saw a process biased against victims. Contem-
porary critics of the courts, on the other hand, see a process biased
in the victims' favor. But litigation is affected by more than matters
ceuticals, 700 F. Supp. 28, 29-30 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment on basis of plaintiff's failure to establish causation in Bendectin
case); Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 403, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 456, 460 (1985) (stipulating that testimony of "reasonable possibility" that
drug had adverse effect was insufficient to deny directed verdict for defendant). Even
the California Supreme Court has drastically restricted the reach of Sindell by holding
that market share liability cannot be imposed in fraud and breach of warranty cases,
and by holding that strict liability does not apply to drug manufacturers. Thus,
market share liability can be imposed only on individual defendants proven to have
acted negligently, and the need to prove negligence on the part of an individual firm
largely wipes out the advantages plaintiffs realize by being allowed to neglect proof
of individual causation. See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1069-71, 751
P.2d 470, 483-84, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 424-25 (1988).
Consider also Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change. 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990), claiming that,
contrary to assertions about a liability crisis, recent trends in products liability
actually favor defendants. The study by Henderson and Eisenberg considers cases
involving private as well as public risks (for example, swimming pools, handguns, off-
road vehicles), and thus provides less than perfect grounds for generalizations about
public risk trends. It nevertheless shows that one should be very cautious about
concluding that present law is biased in favor of public risk victims. All of the
literature claiming to see such a bias seems to rely on the same few instances - cases
involving Agent Orange, DPT vaccine, Bendectin, asbestos. Even if these cases
uniformly reflected abrogation of traditional tort law doctrine, and they do not, it
might still be that they are only idiosyncratic exceptions. Beyond that, the cases
might be much more neutral in their impact than at first appears. Rather than unduly
favoring public risk victims, they might simply reflect an awareness that traditional
doctrine (regarding the burden of proof in particular) demands too much of the
victims of many modem technological risks, and that correctives are therefore
necessary. That argument is implicit in Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 856-58, and
addressed more explicitly in Robinson, supra note 14.
53 See Hines, supra note 45, at 197-99.
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of process; a thoroughgoing critique must be mindful of access bias as
well. We use this term to refer to factors that work systematically for
or against the interests of plaintiffs as they seek to get their public risk
claims into court in the first place.
Process bias arises from the interplay of legal doctrine and adju-
dicative decision makers. It concerns the ways in which judges and
juries interpret and apply the law that defines the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties before them. Access bias, on the other hand, arises
from the interplay of legal doctrine, the structure of litigation, and
the nature of public risk. It concerns the ways in which victims
decide whether (given prevailing doctrine, among other things) liti-
gation is worthwhile, and the ability of victims to initiate claims.
Access is anterior to process; only when obstacles to access are over-
come, so that claims are actually filed and prosecuted, can process
bias come into play.54
Process bias and access bias can combine in various ways. They
can work in tandem and pull together for public risk victims (this
would be the case if victims have easy access to the courts and the
courts treat their claims too sympathetically). Here public risk would
probably be deterred too much, as contemporary critics of the courts
claim. Alternatively, the two kinds of bias can work in tandem but in
favor of public risk producers (considerable obstacles to victim
access combined with harsh treatment of victim claims by the courts),
resulting in too little deterrence of public risk, as Hines concluded.
But process bias and access bias can also work in opposing direc-
tions, and this clouds the picture considerably from the standpoint of
deterrence. Victims might have a fairly easy time getting into court,
only to find their claims treated with hostility once there. Or victims
might confront considerable barriers to access but enjoy a process
bias in their favor should they manage to get before ajudge or jury.
In either event, any excessive deterrence that might otherwise result
from one kind of bias could be offset, perhaps effectively neutralized,
by the presence of the other. Litigation could thus end up more or
less unbiased on balance and not nearly as hard on modern technol-
ogy as critics of the courts maintain.
So we have four alternatives. Which of them most accurately
54 As the text implies, process bias and access bias are to some degree
interdependent. If, for example, courts process claims in a way that favors (disfavors)
plaintiffs, this increases (decreases) the expected value of litigation to plaintiffs and
hence, as we shall see, effectively reduces (enlarges) barriers to access.
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depicts the case of typical public risks? This is the question we con-
sider in some detail below.
A. Access Bias
Professor Hines did not consider the matter of victim access to
the courts; had he done so, his conclusion that judicial control insuf-
ficiently deters public risk would have been all the more emphatic.
To see why, we must return to some of the structural features of
public risk described in Part [I, add to the list of attributes developed
there, and overlay on the enlarged picture a similar depiction of the
structure of litigation.
Public risks, as we saw, are commonly latent in their manifesta-
tions, diffuse in their impacts, and of low probability.55 Moreover, as
their name suggests, they share the characteristics of collective
goods (or, here, collective bads). They tend to be nonrival: their
adverse effects may have simultaneous consequences for a multitude
of victims. Given the nature of modem technologies, these nonrival
effects will commonly be dispersed over large geographic areas, so
that victims - potential plaintiffs - are themselves broadly distrib-
uted. And as is always the case with collective goods and bads, pub-
lic risks tend to be nonexclusive. This means that the benefits of
abatement (should it occur) necessarily extend to all victims, and
cannot be withheld on a piecemeal basis.
To see the significance of these characteristics, consider the gen-
eral structure of litigation and how it relates, first, to private risks.
Lawsuits are costly, and risky of themselves; prosecution entails the
investment of time and money, and success is hardly assured. Only
those among the injured who calculate expected judgments (judg-
ments discounted by the probability of success) in excess of litigation
costs will likely seek access to the adjudication process. In the case
of private risks, where substantial injuries are typically discrete,
immediate, and readily cognizable, the obstacles to recovery (identi-
fying the responsible defendants, establishing their liability, showing
causation, proving the dimensions of loss) may be relatively low.
Thus, expected recoveries for victims of private risk are often suffi-
cient to create incentives to sue, though even here collective goods
effects can damp the rate of litigation. Potential plaintiffs who have
been injured by a product or service identical or similar to the one at
issue in an initial lawsuit can benefit from the information and the
55 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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precedential value generated by that suit, even though they made no
contribution to its prosecution. Thus potential plaintiffs find them-
selves in a strategic relationship - each wishing and waiting for
others to file the initial suit - notwithstanding that all the plaintiffs
want any lawsuit to succeed. This temptation to freeride on the
efforts of others can induce even victims with current positive
expected recoveries to hold back in hopes of enlarging their net
recoveries later.5 6
There are, however, considerations that combat the incentive to
freeride in the case of private risk litigation. First, immediateness of
injury reduces the difficulty of identifying the injuring party and
showing cause and effect, and thus reduces the costs that contribute
to the freeriding temptation. Second, injury is often sufficiently fact-
specific to limit the expected gains of waiting for somebody else to
proceed. Where the defendant's conduct placed a limited number of
people at risk (as in slip-and-fall cases) or the plaintiff's conduct is a
datum relevant to liability (as where a power lawnmower is alleged to
expose users to unreasonable dangers of laceration), the chance of
finding a significant number of others who suffered injuries under
sufficiently similar circumstances to merit freeriding is remote.
These and other features of private risk litigation suggest that
injured parties (and their lawyers) will not generally figure their
expected judgments to be increased by strategic delay.57
Incentives to sue and disincentives to freeride usually diminish
as risk moves from the private toward the public end of the spec-
trum. The characteristic diffuseness of public risks, for example, can
mean small costs per victim notwithstanding large losses in the
aggregate. From the individual litigant's perspective, a relatively
small injury usually will not warrant the substantial costs associated
with proving a case and recovering a judgment. The situation is
aggravated by process concerns, legal doctrines that complicate the
plaintiff's job and thus increase litigation costs. We have in mind,
for example, the requirement of identifying a particular defendant
who more probably than not caused the plaintiff's injury. Unlike the
56 See Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 60 (1977).
The focus here is on the incentives of public risk victims. The incentives of victims'
attorneys are discussed infra text following note 63.
57 Because there is no overlap between one victim's status and that of other
victims, the first victim will make his or her decision parametrically (without attention
to the conduct of others) rather than strategically (taking into account the
expectations of others). See Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective
Goods, 3 EcoN. & PHIL. 245, 255 (1987).
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case of typical private risk litigation, where the party who caused the
injury is usually readily identifiable, public risks often emanate from
mysterious or multifarious sources. In either case, it may be that no
one is sure who is responsible for what.58
Victims might try, of course, to cope with relatively large litiga-
tion costs by forming a coalition, with each victim contributing a
modest sum to what could be a substantial legal war chest. But the
broad geographic dispersion of public risks means that victims too
will be dispersed, and under these conditions coalition is cumber-
some. Coalition can be difficult even when risks are concentrated,
thanks to the strategic implications of nonexclusivity. Since public
risk is borne in common, so too is its mitigation; abatement at the
source benefits not only actual plaintiffs but potential ones as well. If
P sues D successfully, I will win too.59 Why, then, should I agree to
share a part of the burden of anybody else's lawsuit? Why not free-
ride instead, especially given the absence of the countervailing con-
siderations - discussed above 60 - that combat freeriding in the pri-
vate risk context? Public risks tend to be involuntarily or passively
borne, making each individual plaintiff's conduct largely irrelevant;
the fact-specific inquiries that help defeat strategic behavior in the
setting of private risk litigation play little part in public risk cases.
As the incentives to freeride tend to increase with public risk, so
too do the costs of seeking individual (as opposed to collective)
redress. The latency typical, of public risks, for example, attenuates
the connection between cause and effect. Statutes of limitations
might foreclose recovery altogether; in any event, the difficulty of
proving the necessary cause-effect relationship renders victim law-
suits more difficult (costly) and their conclusion less certain. Efforts
to overcome these obstacles by suing now for exposure to risks the
effects of which might materialize later run head on into a host of
troubles arising from the probabilistic nature of public risks. Unable
58 See, e.g., J. KRIER & E. URSIN1, POLLUTION AND POLICY 52-61 (1977) (discussing
uncertainty surrounding sources oF air pollution in Los Angeles). For a discussion of
the legal difficulties caused by uncertainty about the sources of injuries, see
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv.
713 (1982).
59 This is obviously so if injunctive reliefis ordered, but the point applies as well
to damage awards if their likely effect is to induce abatement. The freerider problem
is recognized and discussed by Huber, supra note 3, at 305, yet, surprisingly, Huber
makes no effort to square the existence of the problem with his claim that tort
litigation unduly favors public risk victims. Moreover, Huber assumes that agency
regulatory activity solves the freerider problem, see id. at 328-35, but that
assumption is a very questionable one. See infra notes 101-I1 and accompanying text.
(3 See supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text.
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to show a matured injury, individuals at risk face expected recoveries
discounted not only by the likelihood of losing but also by the uncer-
tainty that the alleged risk will result, eventually, in actual injury.6 1
In short, public risk litigation is structurally biased against victim
access. Victims who might wish to seek redress in the courts con-
front significant obstacles that diminish the incentive to sue.6 2 Pros-
61 Thus a right to sue for the imposition of risk itself is not nearly so favorable
to plaintiffs as some critics of the courts imply. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 3, at 284,
315 (noting that mass producers are held to "stringent standards of liability" and
may be liable for risk created as well as injury actually caused). In any event, most
jurisdictions have refused to recognize a cause of action for being placed at risk, if no
physical harm has materialized. Compare Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781
F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.) (stating that an action for risk of future cancer will be
allowed where future development of cancer is reasonably probable and where there
is current, legally cognizable injury), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) and Anderson
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1230-32 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating that
plaintiff may recover for increased risk of future disease only when the future disease
is a reasonable probability and is part of a disease process developing from a harm
that has already produced an injury), remanded on other grounds, Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) with Ayers v. Township ofJackson, 189 NJ. Super.
561, 567, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (holding that plaintiffs
could not recover for a present condition of enhanced risk of cancer because the risk
was not quantifiable and therefore could not be determined to produce a reasonable
probability of future harm), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 202 NJ.
Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 106 NJ. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). See also Note, Increased Risk of
Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REv. 563, 587, 591-92 (1984) (arguing that
refusal of ten courts to award damages for risk of future illness undercompensated
plaintiffs in cases of exposure to carcinogens); cf. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 777-79 (1983) (holding that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is not required to consider psychological injury to residents
from operation of nuclear power plant); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass.
540, 544-57, 437 N.E.2d 171, 174-81 (1982) (no cause of action for emotional
distress caused by increased risk).
Some jurisdictions have permitted recovery based on existing manifestations of
fear that defendant's prior tortious conduct will cause subsequent injuries, even if no
cause of action is permitted for the increased risk of that injury. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L
& L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 317-19 (5th Cir.) (allowing an action to recover
damages for fear of developing cancer when the fear is reasonable and there is an
actionable injury), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Sterling v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding that "residents
could recover for fear of potential harm from drinking water contaminated by
improperly buried chemical waste), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 855
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 527-
29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that if plaintiff can demonstrate actual physical
injury from inhalation of asbestos fibers, plaintiff can recover damages for emotional
distress based on fear of contracting cancer).
62 We recognize that there are means by which groups sometimes manage to
engage in effective collective action despite freerider problems and other obstacles,
but we doubt that these have much application to the litigation access difficulties
discussed in the text. For example, privatized by-products (such as a "free"
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magazine subscription for people who agree to pay dues and join a group) are often
used to induce self-interested individuals to finance collective efforts. See, e.g., R.
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 31-35 (1982) (noting that while the by-product theory
can serve to explain contributions to existing collective organizations, the theory fails
to explain the organization process itself); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 132-34 (1971) (stating that large or latent pressure groups will succeed in
enlisting individual support only if they have the power to coerce or to offer a non-
collective benefit as an inducement). A conceivable example of this in the setting of
public risk litigation would be, say, a newsletter for victims of Agent Orange who
contribute to a litigation fund. As another example, consider that the sheer
attraction of participation in a group effort may at times overcome the individual
inertia that forestalls collective action, an observation that has been used to explain
popular voting. See H. MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM AND RATIONALITY 21-24
(1982); Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REV. 930, 950-51 (1988). But the argument for participation seems less
compelling when the relevant community is defined by virtue of disease or
victimization, though we can think of counterexamples - Vietnam Veterans,
Disabled American Veterans, a gay community solidified by the AIDS crisis. In
instances like those, though, members of the groups in question usually have
preexisting characteristics in common, whether of status (as veterans, as
homosexuals) or experience (such as combat duty). These facilitate communication
and probably also make for greater participatory benefits than can be realized by
people who share nothing but the plight of being victims.
There are reasons to suppose that people exposed to risk would assiduously
avoid membership in voluntary collectives formed to seek group benefits. The
process of self-selection instrumental to the formation of such groups would entail
admission of prior exposure to dangerous conditions, and various psychological
mechanisms - cognitive dissonance in particular - could push mightily against
acknowledging regret of prior conduct. See Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic
Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 310-14 (1982); Robinson,
Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 191 (Spring 1986). But see A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND
LOYALTY 92-97 (1970) (suggesting that past choices may lead individuals to work to
ensure the success of their ventures when the threat of failure arises). Still, a failure
to support litigation may be consistent with a desire to believe, perhaps erroneously,
that prior events or behavior entailed little risk. Only when confronted with the
actual materialization of injury might victims seek legal redress. This was evident in
testimony at hearings on the fairness of the proposed settlement in the Agent Orange
litigation. Judge Weinstein discovered that a significant number of veterans were
more concerned with public acknowledgment of government misconduct than with
compensation for their injuries. Many of the veterans urged the Judge to reject the
proposed settlement so they could have their day in court. See In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 770-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
Salience is another consideration; it too can ease the burdens of collective
action. See, e.g., Krier & Gillette, supra note 11, at 423 (arguing that voters' stakes in a
salient political issue will be disproportionate to the impact that resolution of the
issue will have on them personally). Unhappily, though, public risks are most likely
to become salient issues only after the risks have materialized.
Quite obviously, the full implications of palliatives like those discussed above
remain to be worked out. Even granting their operation, public risk litigation is likely
to be in too short supply. Cf R. HARDIN, supra, at 11 (suggesting that voluntary
action in settings like that of public risk will be negligible in any event).
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ecution may well not be worthwhile from any individual victim's self-
interested perspective, even if it would be socially desirable.63
Might the potentially powerful triumvirate of entrepreneurial
lawyer, class action, and contingent fee be a cure for at least some of
these ills? The argument is that the lawyer - capable of building a
portfolio of class suits seeking large recoveries, entitled to a percent-
age (say a quarter or more) of any recoveries obtained, and suffi-
ciently skilled to win or favorably settle enough of the cases in the
portfolio to make the enterprise profitable - will manage to sur-
mount at least some of the structural obstacles that stand in the way
of effective victim access. The lawyer can largely avoid freeriding
and other strategic maneuvers. He typically needs relatively little
money to initiate an action and rarely seeks active assistance from
dispersed class members. Diffuse individual costs can be amalga-
mated into one large social cost and brought to bear on the responsi-
ble parties, the plaintiffs' lawyer(s) earning a nice fee in the process.
This picture looks sufficiently promising that one could imagine
public risk lawsuits proceeding at a pace that actually exceeds the
social optimum. Recent scholarship, however, suggests that the
opposite is true, partly because class actions also induce strategy -
on the part now of self-interested lawyers, not litigants.64
Class attorneys are likely to select for their litigation portfolios
only those cases that promise expected personal benefits in excess of
personal costs (including opportunity costs). They will reject cases
that fail this threshold test even if the cases would yield net social
benefits.65 And while expected damages for a class (and thus the
attorneys' expected personal benefits) might commonly be large in
63 See Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal
System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 337-38 (1982).
64 Critics of the courts share the assumption of attorney self-interest. See, e.g.,
Huber, supra note 3, at 318, 328 (arguing that the failure of plaintiffs' attorneys to
acknowledge the existence of competing risks or to accept limits on liability distorts
the effectiveness of litigation as a means of ordering good and bad risks).
65 See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 684-90 (1986) (arguing that the incentives faced by plaintiffs' attorneys
create a situation in which private enforcement of the law is underfunded); Kane, Of
Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. REV. 385, 391
(1987) (arguing that fee awards create major incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to
litigate class actions); cf Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 56-61 (1975) (arguing that in derivative class
actions, plaintiffs' attorneys have an incentive to settle early). Of course, net personal
benefits might be garnered from suits with little probability of success - if, for
example, the attorney can anticipate settlement for nuisance value. See Coffee, supra,
at 701-19.
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public risk cases, the costs of litigation can generally be expected to
be large as well.66 Lawyers must first fight to get their class actions
certified. If successful, they must then confront procedural and sub-
stantive difficulties dealing with proof of causation, standard of liabil-
ity, identification of defendants, and (if there are multiple
defendants) allocation of responsibility among them. Considera-
tions such as these underlie concerns - voiced, for example, by Pro-
fessor Rosenberg - about the sheer, and costly, complexity of
public risk litigation.6 7 Proceeding from the observation that the
tort system delegates total discretion over public risk claim initiation
to the plaintiff attorneys' bar, Rosenberg argues convincingly that
lawyers tend to avoid new public risk lawsuits in favor of more
rewarding alternatives ("sporadic accident" cases).68 They do so
because public risk suits, rather than presenting overwhelmingly
attractive entrepreneurial opportunities, actually offer relatively
unprofitable investments. The suits can, to be sure, generate much
larger judgments than sporadic accident cases, but their complexity
calls for a disproportionate amount of a lawyer's time and other
resources. Exceptions like the ongoing asbestos litigation show that
not every public risk case is regarded as unmarketable by plaintiffs'
66 The expected damages that form the basis for a contingent fee might be less
than one would suppose, even if the probability of a successful lawsuit is high.
Awards for harms that will materialize only in the future (for example, lost earning
capacity) will be reduced to present value; compensation for risk itself will be
discounted to reflect the generally low probability that actual injury will result (if
compensation is allowed in this latter instance at all, see supra note 61). Litigation
costs are, of course, incurred in present dollars, and the amounts can be very
substantial. In the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein awarded the Plaintiffs'
Management Committee $1,711,155.87 for expenses. Related attorneys were
granted additional amounts in excess of $1 million. The amounts did not cover total
attorney costs; Judge Weinstein did not compensate for what he regarded as
duplicative tasks. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296,
1307, 1325, 1344-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 818
F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
67 See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 855-59.
68 See id. at 889-92. "Sporadic accidents" are isolated, ungeneralized wrongs
such as automobile collisions, see id. at 854-55, as opposed to "mass exposure
accidents" that can have "catastrophic consequences." Id. at 851-52. Sporadic
accidents, then, typically grow out of what Huber calls private risks, and mass
accidents out of public risks. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. Huber,
recall, indicts the courts only as a means of dealing with public risks; he endorses
them in the private risk setting. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Rosenberg, on the other hand, endorses the courts as a means of dealing with public
risks, but considers that the tort system may well deal ineffectively with sporadic
accidents, or private risks. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 854-55.
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attorneys,69 but Rosenberg nevertheless considers it "clear that such
attorneys ... will systematically reject mass exposure claims." 70
Some of Professor Coffee's research points in the same direc-
tion.71 He too views plaintiffs' attorneys as risk-taking entrepreneurs
and concludes, with respect to environmental and mass tort litigation
as well as other kinds of cases, that the attorneys' private incentives
to litigate class actions are often "inadequate in terms of their social
benefits." 72 A lawyer who contemplates (as the contingent fee pay-
ment) only a percentage of any damage award will be unwilling to
invest in cases unless the expected fee exceeds personal costs, and
the discrepancy between personal and social break points can be dra-
matic. Thus a lawyer anticipating personal costs (including opportu-
nity costs) of $500,000 will reject a case with a contingent fee of 25
percent unless the client's expected recovery (damages discounted
by the probability of success) exceeds $2,000,000. 7 1 Since, as we
69 See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 892.
70 Id. at 891; see also id. at 892 ("Thus, the 'private law' allocation mechanism,
which relegates case selection to plaintiff attorneys, is systematically biased against
mass exposure claims."). But Rosenberg's conclusions in these respects are based on
the assumption that class actions are unavailable. See id. at 890. He believes that an
improved class action device could much improve the access problem. See
Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62
IND. LJ. 561, 569-73 (1987). We are skeptical, for the reasons discussed in the text.
71 See Coffee, supra note 65, at 676-77; Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 882-96 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation];
Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer for Reform, 62 IND. LJ. 625, 628
(1987).
72 Coffee, supra note 65, at 676.
73 See id. at 686-87. The divergent interests of principals and agents are
thoroughly analyzed in recent literature on agency costs. See, e.g., Cass, Allocation of
Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U.L. REV. 1
(1986) (analyzing the impact of agency costs on various structures proposed for the
allocation of review authority in administrative bodies); Coffee, The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 71, at 883-89 (discussing the diverging interests of
attorneys and clients in class actions); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Finn:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976)
(relating principal-agent problems to a theory of the firm). Notice that the need for a
fee incentive even more dramatically reduces the possibility of obtaining
representation in suits for injunctive relief, or for administrative relief if no statutory
attorney's fee is provided. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 723, 728-29 (1987) (holding that additional fees beyond
standard lodestar are unavailable for purposes of compensating contingent fee
attorneys for risk of loss in case under Clean Air Act); North Carolina Dep't of
Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986) (holding that the
award of fees under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act is appropriate only for
actions enforcing one of the civil rights laws listed in the Act, not for unrelated
injunctive actions to which plaintiffs also are a party).
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have already noted, doctrinal constraints on recovery in public risk
cases are significant, one would expect the discount rate for success
to be quite high.
Even when class actions are taken into the entrepreneurial attor-
ney's litigation portfolio, there remain opportunities for behavior
that can end up understating the social costs of public risk. Since
class members are unlikely to have the day-to-day contact and infor-
mation that they need to monitor their attorneys' conduct, attorneys,
in turn, face few disincentives to skew results in favor of their self-
interest. 74 They will be tempted to file claims merely in order to
establish a stake, then neglect vigorous prosecution either because of
rising opportunity costs or in the hope that damages will increase in
the interim. They will also be tempted to settle on self-interested
terms for an amount too small to vindicate victim interests but struc-
tured so as to include a handsome attorney's fee.75 Hence the filing
and "successful" prosecution of class actions nevertheless leave rea-
sons to suppose that the rate of recovery falls short of the optimum.
To summarize, public risk litigation is probably marked by too
few claims and too little vigorous prosecution, with the likely conse-
quence that too much public risk escapes the deterrent effects of lia-
bility. Those who think otherwise must believe that public risk
claimants find an easy path into court and effective representation
once there. If that conviction is founded on a denial of structural
impediments, we can only respond that the point is neither clearly
stated nor sufficiently examined, and that it flies in the face of cur-
rent understanding. The same response is due those who might
think that the trinity of entrepreneurial lawyer-class action-contin-
gent fee can work litigation miracles.
B. Process Bias
We have just seen that an exclusive focus on obstacles to access
supports the conclusion that the judicial system is biased in favor of
74 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1985)
(observing that "the class representatives furnish the factual basis [for the action],
but the lawyers shape the claims"), aft'd, 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Coffee, The Regulation
of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 7 1, at 884, 898 (noting the attorney's dominant
position in the attorney-client relationship and the inability of the client to monitor
the attorney's performance); Kane, supra note 65, at 395-96 (listing conflicts of
interest potentially dividing attorneys and clients); Miller, Some Agency Problems in
Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 203 (1987) (arguing that current incentive
structures often motivate the attorney to pursue goals not aligned with those of the
client).
75 See Coffee, supra note 65, at 687-90, 717.
RISK, COURTS, AND AGENCIES
too much public risk. Conversely, though, if one looks only at mat-
ters of process - at how claims are treated once they reach the
courtroom - it is not unreasonable to reach exactly the opposite
conclusion. Purely for the sake of argument, then, we shall assume
that judicial doctrine presently overstates the liability of public risk
producers, 76 and thus creates a substantial bias against public risk."
From one perspective, this process bias promises exactly the
consequences we suggested earlier in discussing the lines of the pub-
lic risk debate. "Liability rules that disfavor certain producers will
either drive their risky products out of the market entirely, or inflate
their prices so as to force at least marginal shifts in consumption
toward less strictly regulated sources of hazard.' ' 78 The trouble with
this conclusion, of course, is that it rests on an account that examines
process bias in clinical isolation, rather than as something attached
to a larger structure. Of themselves, doctrinal trends and proposals
might indeed work too much in favor of public risk victims. But
when considered in a context that recognizes judicial processing of
claims as only half (if that) of the story, the same biased develop-
ments can be seen to play a different role. Rather than threatening
to distort, they promise to correct.
C. Bias on Balance
The thrust of our argument must be apparent by now. The pro-
ducers of public risks will be inclined to overindulge, absent signals
that align their self-interest with the larger social interest. At times,
market transactions can generate the necessary signals, in the form
76 There is, moreover, a considerable literature urging the courts to go further.
See, e.g., articles cited supra notes 13 & 14.
77 Turns in the opposite direction are discussed supra note 52. There are also
underway legislative developments that would limit the scope of liability. See, e.g.,
MODEL UNIFORM PROD. LIAB. AcT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) (a model act designed
to reform and stabilize product liability law); see also Dworkin, Product Liability Reform
and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 60 NEB. L. REv. 50, 51-52, 61, 73-74 (1981)
(arguing that the Model Uniform Product Liability Act's impact will be slight because
it incorporates most aspects of current statutory and common law on product
liability, including the availability of "open-ended" awards for pain and suffering);
Schwartz & Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal
Tort Law Standards, 64 DEN. U.L. REv. 685, 686-90 (1988) (arguing that the Federal
Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 has not resulted in lowering the cost of
liability insurance because tort law remains highly unpredictable). For a
compendium of state product liability statutes, many of which tend to reduce liability
periods, limit joint and several liability, and limit damages for non-economic injury,
see [2 Manufacturers-Distributors-Retailers] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 90,112 to
95,270.
78 Huber, supra note 3, at 315-16.
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of price. Government intervention can generate price signals too, by
way of the compliance costs of rules and regulations, by way of fines
and other sanctions for violating those rules and regulations, and -
most particularly here - by way of liability for court judgments.
Risk producers make decisions not simply in reaction to but also in
anticipation of any of these price signals, and in the latter event dis-
count the signal (by the likelihood of its imposition) to an expected
value. Our analysis suggests that access bias, viewed in isolation, may
make the expected value of the signal generated by court judgments
too low. When claims go unfiled, the social costs they represent are
not brought to bear on producer decision making. Because the sig-
nal emanating from the courts is thus weakened, there is likely to be
too much public risk. Those who conclude otherwise argue from
process bias, again viewed in isolation; they contend that harsh doc-
trine makes the expected value of liability too high. Victim claims
are treated too tenderly. Too many costs are internalized. Public
risk producers are saddled with burdens that other risk producers
avoid, and exit the market even ihough their activities are the less
hazardous. There is likely too little public risk.
What this summary account makes apparent is that access bias
and process bias have to be considered together, on balance, as ele-
ments of a larger system, rather than separately, each on its own.
After all, only when obstacles to access are overcome, so that claims
are actually filed and prosecuted, can any doctrinal bias come into
full play.79 Litigation comprises two imperfect parts. Because each
part is imperfect, isolated examination tends to reveal only flaws, and
can inspire corrections that could actually make matters worse.
Hence observers who focus mostly on problems of access should
cautiously avoid advocating reforms that could accomplish too much.
Similarly, so should those who fix their attention on process.
Taking bias on balance, the judicial system might simply be
working to increase the expected value of producer liability for pub-
lic risks to appropriate levels, with the overstatements induced by
process offsetting (and offiset by) the understatements caused by
access.8" Liability judgments that look too harsh of themselves take
on a different character when placed in this larger perspective.
79 For a discussion of the interplay of access and process bias, see supra note 54.
80 The argument here is similar to arguments on behalf of treble damages in
antitrust conspiracies, increased criminal fines when the probability of detection is
low, and punitive damages for intentional torts. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 28, at
194, 204, 207, 293-94 (discussing the relationship between the magnitude of a fine or
liability judgment and the probability of its imposition from the standpoint of
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Consider in this respect the handful of cases that so concerns
some of the courts' critics."1 Any one or all of these can readily
enough be criticized for subjecting particular public risk producers
to unduly harsh treatment. Such expansive liability can drive rela-
tively safe enterprises out of the market, and in this sense the deci-
sions in question are costly. A systemic view, however, suggests the
possibility of an accompanying benefit. By inflating the liability
imposed on any public risk producer brought to judgment, process
bias increases the expected liability that must be anticipated by all
public risk producers in the market, so long as public risk claims
enter the liability system on an essentially random basis.8 2 On this
view, the social costs resulting from inflated liability in any particular
case are simply the premium paid for the service of augmenting
expected values that are probably otherwise too low. The enhanced
recoveries amplify a signal that is weak at its origin. The premium
exacted in the process may be unavoidable, and in any event worth-
while. There is, in short, a flip side to laments about public risk lia-
bility in the courts. All things considered, public risk producers as a
class might be treated evenhandedly, suffering no marked disadvan-
tages relative to the private risk producers whose judicial handling is
said to be acceptable.8 3
This conclusion is necessarily tentative, because our model does
little more than identify some important empirical questions that the
present debate ignores. For example, are access barriers in fact as
substantial as we suggest? On the other hand, is process bias as sub-
stantial as the courts' critics would have us believe? How does the
optimal deterrence). There is a good possibility that what we label process bias
serves not only to correct for problems of access but also to neutralize traditional
rules ofjudicial claims processing that work too harshly against victims in the case of
public risks. In other words, liberal process rules might not be biased in favor of
victims at all; rather, they may simply neutralize older, conservative process rules that
are biased in the opposite direction. If so, judicial doctrine should be liberalized
even further, to compensate for the access bias that remains despite the present
generation of process reforms.
81 See, e.g., cases cited first paragraph supra note 52.
82 If claims enter the system on a random basis, public risk producers are unable
to predict which risks will result in inflated liability and which not; hence all
producers will feel the deterrent effects of enhanced liability. Contrast Huber, supra
note 3, at 320 (stating that tort litigation "is likely to be largely random in its choice
of risk targets," and that "[it is plain that random regulation entails social costs
without commensurate benefits").
83 See supra note 22. The conclusion we reach in the text leads us to recant a
view we stated several years ago - that judicial intervention can do little to curb
undesirable technological trends and may actually only aggravate them. See Krier &
Gillette, supra note 11, at 420 n.51.
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system work out on balance? Is the risk premium (as we have called
it) worth the benefits for which it pays? Issues like these have to be
investigated before embarking on the sweeping reforms proposed by
the critics of the courts.84 The critics argue for substantial judicial
retreat; hence they bear a substantial burden of proof. Our model
shows not that they are wrong; it shows, rather, how they fail to
prove themselves right in their claims about judicial bias against the
producers of public risk.
D. Judicial Competence
Even if the courts are balanced in their treatment of public risk,
it does not automatically follow from this that the judiciary is a good
risk management institution. The claim that the judicial system is
"institutionally predisposed to favor regressive public risk choices" 85
might fail for lack of proof, but the claim of judicial incompetence
would still remain.86
84 To see how difficult some of these issues might be, consider the following
complications, suggested to us by a very illuminating correspondence with Professor
Richard Craswell of the Universty of Southern California Law Center. Craswell
observes that although access bias and process bias probably do work in opposite
directions, it does not necessarily follow that they offset in a neat way. One would
have to know more about the magnitude of each kind of bias, and about the setting in
which the biases operate. Suppose, for example, a setting in which (1) some firms
that should be held liable manage to escape detection, but (2) other firms that should
not be held liable are held liable nevertheless. Here there would be offsetting effects
in terms of the impact of liability on any firm's expected profits, but there would not
be offsetting effects in terms of deterrence. Consideration (1) might induce firms to
ignore the creation of undue risk, because the firms expect to avoid detection. Yet
consideration (2) can have exactly the same effect, because firms figure that there is
some probability they will be held liable even where liability is inappropriate.
Now hold consideration (1) constant, change consideration (2) to suppose that
firms are never (or almost never) held inappropriately liable, and add, as an
additional consideration (3), that firms held liable are hit with damages much larger
than the expected value of the risks they imposed. Here consideration (1) would still
undermine deterrence, but consideration (3) would work in the opposite direction.
The issues that then arise have to do with the magnitude of the two effects - does
consideration (3) just nicely cancel consideration (1), or does it not do enough, or
does it do too much?
At bottom, the questions are whether tort liability in the public risk case works in
a setting more like that characterized by considerations (1) and (2), or more like that
characterized by considerations (1), (2), and (3) - and, in the latter event, what the
magnitude of the effects of considerations (1) and (3) might be. The general lesson is
that what appear to be offsetting "pro-defendant" and "pro-plaintiff" biases might
not be offsetting at all, and even if they are, the magnitudes of the biases are
important. It is for reasons like these that we state our own conclusions in less than
conclusive terms.
85 Huber, supra note 3, at 329.
86 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
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Imagine, for example, that the risk premium exacted by the
courts proves to be worthwhile. Could it nevertheless be avoided or
at least made significantly smaller? Are there alternative institutions
that can achieve something like the optimal amount of public risk in
a more adroit (less expensive) way? For critics of the courts, the
answer is yes. Administrative agencies, however imperfect them-
selves, would be a very considerable improvement.8 7 For this rea-
son, courts operating in the civil liability setting are implored to
defer to the experts of administrative agencies that have undertaken
"searching and complete ... regulation."8 8 If an agency has deter-
87 See, e.g., Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation
Systems, 73 GEO. LJ. 1357, 1374 (1985) (stating that administrative agencies can deal
with many liability issues more effectively than can the courts); Huber, supra note 3, at
331-35 (arguing that regulatory agencies are better equipped to resolve issues
concerning large scale public risks than are courts); Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation,
and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 130-31 (1988) (noting judicial
insensitivity to the goals of regulatory legislation and fundamental judicial
misunderstanding of the evidence used by administrative agencies for risk as-
sessment); see also supra note 20.
88 Huber, supra note 3, at 334. Notice the vagueness of the relevant standard, an
especially striking vagueness given that Huber has criticized others, most notably
Professor Yellin, for proposing a similarly loose guideline ("complex technology") to
determine when close judicial scrutiny of agency regulatory decisions is appropriate.
See id. at 312-14.
Professor Kip Viscusi, an economist, has also argued that compliance with
administrative regulations should, in certain instances, foreclose civil liability.
"Firms should be exempted from potential liability in court actions if they can
demonstrate either compliance with a government regulation that leads to an
efficient degree of safety, or the use of a hazard warnings program that leads the
market to promote an efficient level of risk." Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation:
Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, 78 Am. ECON. REV. 300, 303
(Papers & Proceedings 1988). Viscusi's test, like Huber's, would be extraordinarily
difficult to apply. Beyond that, both tests could prove to be counterproductive.
Agency regulations might set standards that are efficient, but only from the
standpoint of the median firm in the regulated industry - meaning that the
standards would be unduly lax as to firms that can produce safety at lower than the
average cost, and unduly demanding as to firms with higher than average safety costs.
In this connection, consider Huber's observation that courts and agencies alike
commonly agree that "administrative risk regulation is intended to set only a safety
'floor' - a threshold of performance, a minimum degree of 'acceptable' safety."
Huber, supra note 3, at 334. It appears, though, that Huber thinks this pattern holds
only where "the administrative regulatory regime is casual or sporadic, as with
consumer products," and not in the case of "comprehensively regulated industries"
that produce vaccines and pesticides or build and operate electric power plants,
apparently because here regulation is "searching and complete." Id. If agencies set
standards that are efficient only on average, then exemption from civil liability on the
grounds of compliance with the regulatory program could yield suboptimal amounts
of safety: firms with lower than average costs would underinvest. The matter is a
complicated one, though, because denying the compliance defense could result in
overinvestment in safety by firms with higher than average costs. See Schwartz,
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mined (in the course of a licensing proceeding, for instance, or
through regulatory hearings) that a particular public risk is progres-
sive, liability on the producer's part should thereafter be foreclosed
so long as it meets the terms of its license or complies with applica-
ble regulations.
8 9
In another setting, judicial review of administrative activity, the
prescription once again advanced is judicial deference to agency
decisions. This is why Mr. -uber, a chief critic of the courts and an
earnest champion of the agencies when it comes to public risk, criti-
cizes Professor Yellin and others for proposing expanded and more
intrusive judicial oversight of the regulatory process.9" Such propos-
als would simply repeat the shortcomings of related reforms in the
area of civil liability. Under Yellin's program, for example, only new
sources of public risk would receive heightened scrutiny. They alone
would be burdened with the direct costs of the review process and
the indirect costs of delay. Huber objects to this by arguing that new
risks are already disadvantaged by premarket regulation, and that
expanded judicial review would only make matters worse. The costs
of the process could keep some progressive new risks off the market;
their introduction would in any event be delayed by protracted
inquiry, and meanwhile society would suffer unnecessary hazards. 9 1
The difficulty is that the argument on behalf of agency expertise
fails to provide a satisfying systemic account. Suppose, for example,
that courts do end up biased against public risk. Might agencies tend
to be biased in the opposite direction? Barriers to access could, after
all, result in agency bias if they limit the ability of potential public
risk victims - but not public risk producers - to influence agency
thinking. Similarly, agencies might process risk decisions in a biased
way. Or suppose that couri:s are incapable of dealing with risk in a
highly competent fashion. Might administrative agencies and the
experts they employ be something less than competent themselves?
A respectable comparative approach would consider questions like
these. Whether in the setting of civil liability or in that of judicial
review, a sensible assessment of the courts has to confront the skep-
tic's query: Compared to what? It is hardly enough to catalog judi-
cial weaknesses and administrative strengths; the other side of each
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 388-91
(1988).
89 See Huber, supra note 3, at 334-35.
90 See id. at 312-14.
1 Remember Huber's assertion that on average new risks are safer than the old
risks they displace. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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institution has to be considered too. Having done some of this with
the courts, which the critics attack, we turn now to the agencies,
which they defend as the less biased, more competent institution. Is
their case a convincing one?
IV. RISK, AGENCIES, AND EXPERTS
Since their birth a century ago, their great endorsement during
the New Deal, and their extraordinary proliferation over the last fifty
years, administrative agencies have come to be seen by some as the
ideal institution for managing complex social problems. In princi-
ple, after all, agencies can provide what markets and courts some-
times cannot: expert regulation in the public interest. Given the
complexity of public risk, the problems of market failure, and the
shortcomings of the courts, administrative rule seems an obvious
course to take.
Obvious, though, only if one envisions agencies in the idealized
terms of the New Deal.92 If, instead, one is motivated - by simple
curiosity, by skepticism, or by allegiance to a persistently systemic
investigation - to consider how reality might depart radically from
the ideal, then a rather different image comes into view. One can see
that agencies, like markets and courts, are themselves easily capable
of failure. The generalization is obvious, but we are interested in
particulars. Most to the point here, we are interested in the possibil-
ity of agency failure of a very specific sort - a systematic tendency in
favor of too much public risk. In pursuing this line of inquiry we aim
to provide not an exhaustive or decisive account, but only a sugges-
tive one. The issue is whether the courts should defer to administra-
tive agencies in cases of public risk. Our account suggests that the
answer is much more complicated than a sanitized vision of adminis-
trative decision making might suggest.
92 The New Deal image is one of agencies with considerable expertise exercised
free of political influence and judicial meddling. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W.
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 4-6 (1981) (discussing New Deal affirmation of
expertise insulated from central political control and judicial oversight). A
commentator like Huber obviously endorses the idealized view of administrative
agencies. In Safety and the Second Best, supra note 3, he stresses administrative
expertise, assumes political neutrality, and argues for limited judicial oversight of
agency decisions. A similarly idealized view of agencies underlies the argument in
Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63
CH.-KENT L. REV. 579 (1987). The view is criticized for its unworldliness in Epstein,
Causation - In Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 678-80 (1987);
Schwartz, Causation in Private Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
639, 649-51 (1987).
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A. Risk Assessment and Management
Risk management and its antecedent, risk assessment, are rele-
vant to much of the following discussion, so it makes sense to start
with a brief and highly stylized sketch of some methodological
fundamentals.9 3
Take risk assessment first. Whatever the suspected hazard in
question, estimating its dangers involves essentially four lines of
investigation: defining the conditions of exposure, identifying
adverse effects, determining the probabilistic relationships between
exposure and effect (such as dose/ response), and calculating overall
risk. Each of these tasks obviously calls for information; each also
calls for judgment - in fixing the scope of inquiries, conducting
investigations, interpreting findings, determining their weight. How
difficult it will be to get reliable information, and the degree to which
judgment enters the assessment process, range from the trivial to the
extraordinary. In some cases, for instance those concerning the risks
of driving at various speeds, experience will have generated abun-
dant quantities of unexotic data, much of it already compiled into
transparent statistical statements. Here assessment is a relatively
straightforward exercise. The exercise becomes more taxing, and
the role of judgment increases, in instances where directly relevant
data about hazards have not been gathered or do not exist. Deter-
mining the risks that might attend new applications of some familiar
drug, for example, commonly requires epidemiological studies as
well as clinical experiments. Both kinds of work are difficult and
expensive to design, execute, and interpret, so risk assessments
based on them present significantly greater challenges than in the
first sort of case. Consider finally a third category of instances, those
involving technologies (such as recombinant DNA or various aspects
of nuclear power) "so new that risk assessment must be based on
93 One can look at any number of references for an introduction to risk
methodology. We draw our account from I. Hoos, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN PUBLIC
POLICY: A CRITIQUE 288-92 (rev. ed. 1983); W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK:
SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 18-44 (1976); Fischhoff, Svenson &
Slovic, Active Responses to Environmental Hazards: Perceptions and Decision Making, in 2
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1089, 1091-1102 (D. Stokols & I. Altman
eds. 1987); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived
Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463-84 (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter Slovic, Fischhoff &
Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears]; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Rating the Risks,
ENV'T, Apr. 1979, at 14, 15 (Fig. 1) [hereinafter Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein,
Rating the Risks]; Wilson & Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction, 236
Sci. 267, 267-69 (1987).
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complex theoretical analyses such as fault trees .... rather than on
direct experience." 94 These are the cases at the heart of the public
risk debate and, thus, the cases of greatest interest to us. They are
the most important and controversial. They are attended by the least
information. They call for the most judgment.
The fault (or decision, or event) trees referred to above are a
diagrammatic means to subject important decisions about uncertain
events to the discipline of careful thinking. They are called trees
"because of the tree-like schematic design used to depict relation-
ships within the system" in question.95 Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lich-
tenstein, who say (as already suggested) that "[f]ault trees are used
most often to characterize hazards for which direct experience is not
available," 96 give as an example a tree depicting the possible escape
into the environment of radioactive material from nuclear wastes
buried in a salt mine. At the base of the tree are boxes indicating the
many external influences (one hopes all) that might permit waste to
escape (for example, rock pressure, fault movement, accidental drill-
ing) into groundwater (the next level up the tree) and subsequently
into the atmosphere (at the top of the tree). The escape route could
also bypass groundwater and carry radioactivity directly into the
atmosphere if a volcano erupts, a nuclear weapon explodes, or a
meteor collides with the earth. Slovic and company drolly conclude
their brief description of the fault tree methodology by observing
that it "may be used to map all relevant possibilities and to deter-
mine the probability of the final outcome. To accomplish this latter
goal, the probabilities of all component stages, as well as their logical
connections, must be completely specified.",97 Even then the risk
assessment exercise is not finished. One would still have to con-
struct an additional or extended tree based on "release into the
atmosphere" and branching off to consider all the different ways
(subject to meteorological and other variables) radioactivity might
affect human and other resources, and when, and to what degree,
and with what possible consequences. Following that, and to get to
the management side of the question, one would need a tree depict-
ing alternative courses of action (which could include doing noth-
ing), together with estimates of the size and distribution of their
expected costs and benefits. One would also need a means to com-
pare the risk in question to the extant risks it might serve to displace.
94 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears, supra note 93, at 463.
95 I. Hoos, supra note 93, at 288.
')6 Slovic, Fischhoff& Lichtenstein, Rating the Risks, supra note 93, at 15 (Fig. 1).
97 Id.
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All of these stages, of course, are once again dependent on good
information and good judgment. It is doubtful whether even the
most well-intentioned agencies can perform the required tasks with
anything close to the comprehensive rationality implicit in the
method. As we shall see, a developing literature suggests that
human problem solving suffers from limited computational capacity,
incomplete searches for alternatives, limited information, and uncer-
tainty about consequences, 9 13 yet failure in any of these respects can
have a profound effect on ultimate judgments about risk.99 Risk
assessment and management are neither neutral sciences nor well-
mastered arts.
B. Access and the Problem of Capture
With the foregoing background in mind, we focus in this and the
next section on some of the possible consequences of pronounced
deference to administrative agencies. We are concerned not simply
with how agencies actually behave currently, but also with how they
might be expected to behave were they granted more freedom than
at present. What might the practice of risk assessment and manage-
ment look like then?
As a way of beginning, recall the argument that in the litigation
setting public risk victims (and their attorneys) are susceptible to
incentives that work at cross purposes with actual victim interests
and hold them back from the courts. As a result, and absent any
corrective, one could expect too little by way of deterrence coming
out of the courts because too little by way of claims goes in. The
administrative setting looks at first to be different, because agencies
are not formally dependent -on outside initiative; they need not wait
for victim claims in order to embark on "searching and complete"
98 See, e.g., H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR at xxviii-xxxi (3d ed. 1976);
March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. Sci. 587, 589-91 (1978) (noting that substantial error is likely in anticipating
future consequences of present actions); Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue
of Psychology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 293 (1985). On the less
theoretical side, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROGRAM EVALUATION AND
METHODOLOGY DIVISION 87-14, HI.ALTH RISK ANALYSIS: TECHNICAL ADEQUACY IN
THREE SELECTED CASES 82-83 (1987), a study of the procedures used by federal
agencies responsible for regulating environmental health and safety. The GAO study
found that agency decisions about what information to gather tended to be based on
what information was available and on what other agencies were doing.
!. ) See, e.g., infra notes 211-12 & 216-24 and accompanying text.
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regulatory efforts.' 00 Hence it seems they can avoid the problem of
access that burdens the judicial system.
Administrative power to seize the initiative is especially appeal-
ing to anyone who believes that when public agencies act, they act in
the public interest. Just such a faith seems to be reflected in some of
the views voiced by Mr. Huber, particularly the claim that public
agencies can supply "a 'public' point of view on the problem"''l of
risk assessment and management. Less clear is the source of this
public point of view, or the basis for believing that agency initiative
would necessarily serve it. 10 2 Assessment and management are, as
we saw, heavily dependent on a wide range of information and val-
ues. How any particular risk decision comes out is likely to turn in
part on what happened to go into an agency's deliberations. Hence
an abiding faith that outcomes are in the public interest requires an
underlying conviction that information and values filter into and out
of agencies in some evenhanded way. If, however, risk producers
have a comparative advantage over risk consumers in getting the
administrative ear, then agency decision making might be marred by
access bias just as judicial decision making is.
The problem we have in mind is a variation on some central
themes in the literature about agency "capture," a body of theory
and evidence familiar enough to require only a brief account here. 103
Capture theory proceeds from the notion that the motivations and
behavior of private citizens and public officials in political markets
are similar to those of producers and consumers in ordinary eco-
nomic markets. Citizens (in this case, risk producers and risk con-
sumers) and officials (here, those involved in the process of risk
regulation) are assumed to be substantially self-interested and to
1oo See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
1l Huber, supra note 3, at 331. Beyond this, a faith in the good public-
mindedness of agencies is implicit in Huber's argument for judicial deference to
agency expertise. The argument could not even start to make sense absent a
conviction that agencies can be expected to rise above the influence of narrow private
interests and act to serve some broad public interest instead.
102 See Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis,
in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9, 24 (R. Noll ed. 1985); Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 336-44 (1974).
103 For a sample of general treatments written from various perspectives, see W.
NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971); Cass, supra
note 73; Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE LJ. 1395
(1975); Noll, The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy, 139 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 377 (1983); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Posner, supra note 102; Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1971).
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want their private interests served by political and regulatory
processes in ways that may have little in common with what would
serve the larger public interest.', 4
Self-interest is easy enough to picture in the case of risk produ-
cers and consumers, but its meaning regarding political officials,
administrators in particular, is worth a few words. With respect to
public actors, self-interest can mean something as obvious (and
acceptable) as wanting to avoid embarrassing technical errors in the
course of making decisions, as trivial as wanting to save time and
effort during the day-to-day routine (in order to nurse the agency
budget or enhance agency l.eisure), or as substantial (and possibly
tainted) as wanting to advance agency or personal power and
resources. Agency and personal advancement, in turn, are likely to
be a function of the reactions to agency decisions by the legislative
and executive branches, by the electorate, by the presumed targets
and supposed beneficiaries of agency action, and by potential
employers of agency personnel, whether within the government, or
without.
Just as public officials have the means to satisfy the interests of
private citizens, citizens have the potential to serve the interests of
officials. They can provide information and points of view. They can
contribute money to political campaigns and administrators' pockets.
They can assemble blocks of voters. They can offer employment
opportunities. These examples mix sinister elements with benign
ones, but the capture argument hardly depends on the former.
There is nothing sinister in the fact that various citizens might cluster
into interest groups for the purpose of contributing resources -
data, perspectives, arguments - to administrative deliberations.
Nor is it troubling that each such group might hold some sort of
proxy for one or another popular attitude or value (whether the
proxy is measured in the number of votes, or the number of dollars,
that the group might be able to deliver to the political backers of
administrators who make acceptable decisions). Information, points
of view, voter attitudes, and dollars as a measure of intensity of voter
attitudes are, after all, obviously relevant to making decisions in the
public interest (unless the public interest means something utterly
unrelated to what the public is interested in).
104 Notice from the text that we regard citizens and officials as "substantially"
(not ruthlessly) self-interested; moreover, we concede that private and public
interests may at times be entirely congruent, but also think it obvious that on many
occasions they are not. Given all oF this, our purpose is to trace the implications of a
tendency, in the setting of public risk regulation, to behave in a self-interested way.
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That interest groups express their views by these means, then,
does not necessarily imply tawdry politics; to the contrary, there
might be no other practical way to discern much of the meaning of
"the public interest" in a democratic system. The model is interest
group pluralism and its idea that agency output (self-interest
notwithstanding) will approximate the social good as long as the out-
put results from countervailing pressures brought to bear by any
number of interested groups, each of which has roughly equal access
to the decision making'process. Capture theory shows how the plu-
ralist model can go wrong. Almost by definition, interest group plu-
ralism can endorse decisions as "in the public interest" only if all the
various interest groups are indeed able to voice their wants effec-
tively. If, instead, some groups enjoy a comparative advantage in
catering to administrative needs and desires (that is, if the pluralist
process is too singular, not sufficiently plural), there arises the dan-
ger that agency attention will be captivated by too narrow a range of
interests and be diverted from an appropriately public per-
spective.10
5
Whether, and how much, bias is likely to result from asymmetric
access to the administrative process depends considerably on the
nature of any particular item on the regulatory agenda. In the case
of public risk generally, though, the problem appears to be a sub-
stantial one, as should be obvious from our discussion of access bias
in the courts.10 6 We saw in that discussion how the typical character-
istics of public risk - impacts that are latent, diffuse, widely dis-
persed, of low probability, and nonexclusive - limit the ability of
potential and actual public risk victims to gain access to the
courts.'t 7 Our point here is that they can also frustrate the efforts of
victims to mobilize for the purpose of influencing agency decisions
about risk. Whatever the objective of the mobilization effort (it
might be to prepare and provide a good research product for agency
consideration, or to present a convincing brief for the victim point of
view, or to gather a crowd to attend public hearings, or to organize
an effective lobby), considerable amounts of time, effort, and money
105 Noll suggests that some regulatory agencies are particularly susceptible to
domination by selected interest groups because their "single-purpose" mission and
limited range of authority render them unable to accommodate all interest groups.
Our treatment, in contrast, emphasizes the relative abilities of all people interested in
an agency's decisions to influence agency action, whether or not the agency has a
single-purpose mission. See Noll, supra note 102, at 44.
106 See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
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will be required.'" 8 These resources will also, however, be hard to
find. The diffuseness of public risks, coupled with the fact that mate-
rialization of any physical injury will usually be remote in time
(latent) and in probability, reduces incentives to contribute much to
the common cause. So does the nonexclusive nature of favorable
agency action.' 0 9 Efforts to overcome some of these obstacles by
appealing directly to potential group members for support confront
the same obstacles. The appeals themselves require a force of per-
sonnel sufficiently large and energetic to address victims who will
usually be dispersed over broad geographic areas. Hence the prob-
lem of mobilization remains.
Look now at the other side of the story, and consider the ability
of public risk producers to muster effective interest groups. Their
organizational burdens will generally be lighter for any number of
well-known reasons: there are fewer potential group members; each
member will usually know the identity of most others; each member
is likely to have a relatively large, concentrated, and immediate stake
in agency decisions, as compared to public risk victims; each has
greater assets (wealth, information, personnel, facilities, and so
forth) to tap than any one or several (or even many) victims; com-
monly all or many of the members will already be organized, say
through a trade association.. Taken together, these considerations
facilitate effective communication, provide opportunities to monitor
individual contributions and chastise noncontributors, increase the
likelihood that the private benefits of group action will exceed pri-
vate costs, and forestall freeriding behavior." ' 0 In short, the costs of
organizing collective efforts will generally be lower for the producers
than for the victims of public risk, and this in turn means producers
will generally enjoy a considerable comparative advantage in mobil-
izing interest groups and exercising influence, whether by benign or
sinister means. 1
The foregoing analysis simply elaborates a familiar generaliza-
tion. Large groups seeking agency decisions that would yield diffuse,
108 The power to vote, while a relatively inexpensive form of citizen
participation in policy making, is seldom a good substitute for organized interest
group activity aimed directly at agency deliberations. See Krier & Gillette, supra note
11, at 422-23.
109 If the action benefits any risk victim it will likely benefit virtually all, so each
victim will be tempted to freeride on the supposed contributions of others.
110 See Krier & Gillette, supra note 11, at 424.
1II Note that Huber seems to concede this when he mentions in passing that
"[a]gencies will point out that they rely mostly on data furnished by the regulatees
themselves." Huber, supra note 3, at 334.
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remote, dispersed, and nonexclusive benefits are handicapped rela-
tive to small groups seeking decisions that would avoid (or fighting
decisions that would impose) concentrated costs. The generaliza-
tion applies to the case of risk regulation as much (if not more) as to
any other, which is not to say that it is free of interesting exceptions.
One can no doubt point to instances of risk regulation, and even to
instances of risk-regulation agencies, that stand in contrast to our
account. 112 But we are concerned with tendencies, and especially
with tendencies that would exist if there were broader deference to
agency rule than at present. In this context, the problem of asym-
metric access suggests that agency decisions would tend in the direc-
tion of producer interests, and thus toward too much public risk.
Before closing this section, let us briefly mention two points
directly related to our earlier discussion of access bias in civil-claim
litigation. First, note that just as class actions are not an easy answer
to access barriers in the judicial setting, public interest organizations
are not an easy answer in the agency setting (including within that
setting judicial review of agency activity). Public interest organiza-
112 Commonly, though, the exceptions can be explained in ways entirely
consistent with the idea that small groups, or groups that can largely privatize the
benefits of their activity, have a comparative advantage when it comes to influencing
government activity. See Krier & Gillette, supra note 11, at 424-26; supra note 62.
It is possible that agency officials may at times find it in their own interests to
regulate risk very strictly - more strictly, indeed, than the public at large would wish.
Picture as an example a drug manufacturer who must obtain administrative approval
of a new product that promises to be very beneficial but can also have severe side
effects. Administrators may be motivated to drag their feet, perhaps even to deny the
new drug access to the market, out of fear that the salience of severe side effects that
could result if the drug were to be approved would bring more blame to them than
would the likely much less salient loss of benefits that could follow from turning
down the drug. SeeJ. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 131 (1979). Generally speaking, then, one could suppose that
bureaucrats charged with licensing risky (but risk-reducing) products and activities
feel some temptation to act conservatively - a complaint frequently aired by drug
manufacturers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and speaking more generally still, any over-
regulation induced by salience or other considerations in the short term is likely to
get worn away over the course of time (for instance, stiff regulations might be relaxed
later on, or implemented and enforced in a way more friendly to risk producers).
Risk producers are, as we saw, commonly more intensely interested and better
organized than are potential victims; hence they are more motivated and more able
to maintain concerted pressure on the regulating agencies. Concerted pressure, in
turn, has the most promise of success in instances where any adverse side effects of
agency decisions friendly to producer interests could be expected to appear only
after a long period of latency - for then the bureaucrats making decisions have less
reason to fear eventual blame. They will be long gone. See infra text following note
269.
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tions themselves require support - they are not a costless enterprise
- and will, for just the reasons canvassed above, have difficulty get-
ting it. Almost by definition, the organizations are likely to be in too
short supply. Second, it is possible that agencies might present vic-
tims with more substantial access problems than do courts. Individ-
ual victims of public risk have at least some incentive to proceed on
their own with claims in court for damages. In the agency setting,
however, the notion of effective individual victim action seems virtu-
ally nonsensical: almost never would one or a few victims find it
worthwhile (or possible) to deliver items of substantial interest to
self-interested administrators. That public risk producers can initi-
ate administrative but not (usually) judicial liability proceedings pro-
vokes further concern. This lets them anticipate problems and
mobilize to influence an agency's agenda well in advance of focused
public concern and pointed regulatory decision making, much in the
manner of building bulwarks against an expected tide.
C. Process and the Meaning of Risk
The last section's story was a cautionary tale, warning that a def-
erential attitude toward agency decisions could lead to too much
public risk. The story in this section ends with the same lesson, but it
begins in a very different way. We worried above that asymmetric
access might distort an egoistical agency's image of the public inter-
est. Here we abandon the assumptions on which those concerns
were based, happily grant every wish of public interest theorists, and
hence suppose that agencies are invulnerable to undue outside influ-
ence and selflessly dedicated to a rational vision of the social good.
Still, we think, the likely result of deference to such agencies would
be too much public risk, at least so far as the public is concerned." 13
113 Since we are curious about what might go on inside an utterly uncaptivated
agency's publicly interested mind, we imagine for now an agency with pure and
selfless intentions that are incorruptible because the agency is perfectly insulated
from outside influences (or subject to exactly offsetting ones). The idea of insulated
agencies is briefly addressed in S. Rose-Ackerman &J. Peracchio, Administrative Law
and Political Economy, Report on a Conference of Columbia University's Center for
Law and Economic Studies 6-8 (Working Paper No. 6, Nov. 1985) (remarks of B.
Ackerman and J. Krier). That our agency image is fanciful does not preclude its
being useful for present purposes, but should unsettle anyone skeptical about the
capture story that figured in the last section. A real-world account would consider
that the tendencies we investigate in this section no doubt work in concert with those
explored in the last, and that concerted action is likely only to exaggerate forces
working in the direction of too much public risk. See infra text following note 176;
notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
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The key to this conclusion can be found by asking an important
question that all the discussion thus far has simply begged: What
does "risk" mean? To anticipate our argument, suppose that the con-
cept signifies different things to different people - more particu-
larly, one thing to agency experts and another to the lay public." 4
Suppose, in addition, that while each of these meanings is sensible,
the expert definition implies levels of public risk that are, by the lay
definition, almost invariably too high. It then follows that a selfless
agency, determined and free (because of expansive deference) to
assess and manage public risk in accord with its own conception, will
end up regulating less than called for from the public's point of view.
The resulting contest is, at bottom, one of competing rationalities,
and its resolution is a matter of ethics and politics, not technical
expertise. Nothing in the training, credentials, or legitimacy of risk
assessors or bureaucrats qualifies them to settle the issue. Hence
deference to agencies would grant them ground they have no right
to claim. Deference would beg a central question in the control of
public risk.
That, in a paragraph, is our argument. Problems of access aside,
bias can still result from the way agencies process risk decisions.
Hence regulatory efforts might be misdirected for reasons entirely
independent of those considered in the last section."1
To begin the discussion, return to the central question: What
does risk mean? We asked this, but only implicitly, many pages ago
- and alluded to one answer. Risk, we suggested, can be seen as the
function of expected mortality or morbidity, or what we shall here
114 See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson & Ratick, The
Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 RIsK ANALYSIS 177, 181 (1988)
("[R]isk has meaning only to the extent that it treats how people think about the
world and its relationships. Thus there is no such thing as 'true' (absolute) and
'distorted' (socially determined) risk.").
115 In this connection, see Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in
2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253 (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds.
1988):
[A]gencies may be populated by professionals that genuinely attempt to
pursue public interest objectives, but who have a narrow or uninformed
perception of where that interest lies. One potential problem is an over-
emphasis of a particular bias in the methods of a professional group, such
as the emphasis of economists on theoretical efficiency, lawyers on
procedural equity, or medical care professionals on risks to health.
Id. at 1278. Noll goes on to distinguish this problem of what we call process bias
from the "problem ... that analysts may be forced to rely on selective information
that is controlled by interest groups," an illustration of the access bias that we consid-
ered in the last section. Id.
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refer to as expected annual fatalities or "body counts," and in these
terms many public risk technologies might indeed seem to be rela-
tively safe." 6 Those who favor modern technological developments
do so in part precisely because they, like most experts, gauge risk in
just this way. They may disagree about details, such as whether one
looks at total expected deaths, deaths per person or per hour of
exposure, or loss of life expectancy due to exposure," 7 but generally
speaking "experts appear to see riskiness as synonymous with
expected annual mortality [and morbidity].""' 8 So, for example,
when technical experts are asked to rank the risks of various activities
and technologies, "their responses correlate highly with technical
estimates of annual fatalities." 1"9 When experts write about relative
risk, they implicitly or explicitly use body counts as the relevant mea-
sure. '2 And, in a way seemingly consistent with the logic of their
method, they insist that a death is a death is a death - 1,000 lives
lost in a single anticipated annual catastrophe, or through many acci-
dents expected every year, or lost ten-fold but only once every dec-
ade on average, or lost in a single community or across the country,
are all the same to them.' 2 '
1 16 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Fischhoff, Svenson & Slovic, supra note 93, at 1095; Fischhoff,
Managing Risk Perceptions, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH., Fall 1985, at 83, 89.
118 Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Sci. 280, 283 (1983) (citation omitted); see also
Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181, 191-92 (R. Schwing &
W. Albers, Jr. eds. 1980) (experts view risk as synonymous with technical fatality
estimates).
119 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective,
in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 263 (R. Noll ed. 1985)
[hereinafter Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk]; see also id. at 266 (Fig.
4) (showing that experts' risk judgments are closely associated with annual fatality
rates); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Rating the Risks, supra note 93, at 19 (study
results showed that "[t]he experts' mean judgments were so closely related to the
statistical or calculated frequencies that it seems reasonable to conclude that they
viewed the risk of an activity or technology as synonymous with its annual fatalities").
120 See, e.g., Huber, supra note 3, at 294-304, 300 n.92, 314 n. 138 (discussing the
hazards of various goods, services, and technologies in terms of the number of
people affected).
121 See, e.g., Nichols & Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk
Assessments Distort Regulation, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 13, 23 (expressing
skepticism about the notion that the loss from one large accident is greater than that
from the same number of deaths occurring either one-at-a-time or in smaller
clusters), discussed infra note,. 163-68 and accompanying text. Nichols and
Zeckhauser do not necessarily equate all deaths, however; for instance, they
recognize the argument that public aversion to death by cancer should be given
weight in policy decisions about which deaths to prevent. See Nichols & Zeckhauser,
supra, at 20. Moreover, Zeckhauser has advocated the use of a scale involving Quality
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In the view of experts, then, risk is a one-dimensional phenome-
non, a fact that has filtered its way into even the popular literature. A
review article in Science 85 reports that "[wlhen experts assess the
risks of a technology, they are most concerned with how many peo-
ple die from it in an average year."' 22 Another article, appearing in
a magazine section of The Washington Post, says that "[r]isk for the
experts means how many people will die, but risk for the public
means that plus a great deal more."' 23
For the lay person, risk is n-dimensional, as William Lowrance
suggested in an early study. He observed that a variety of considera-
tions in addition to expected fatalities and injuries affect people's
judgments about risk: involuntary exposure, delayed effects, scien-
tific uncertainty about the hazard in question, "dreaded" versus
common hazards (for example, the threat of death from invisible
radiation as opposed to an auto accident), irreversible consequences,
and others.' 24 Since the time of Lowrance's work, any number of
studies have found "that many attributes other than death rates
determine judgments of riskiness" by lay people, whose "model of
what constitutes risk appears to be much richer than that held by
most technical experts."' 25 Thus the public is known to be con-
cerned about risks that have catastrophic potential, that are unfamil-
iar, uncontrollable, or involuntary, that threaten future generations,
that would concentrate fatalities in time or space, that are distinc-
tively threatening as opposed to widespread and shared by the gen-
eral population, that are manmade as opposed to natural.' 26
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), which would vary with groups or individuals, for
evaluating the social value of avoiding specific harms that fall on discrete groups. See
Zeckhauser, Measuring Risks and Benefits of Food Safety Decisions, 38 VAND. L. REV. 539,
559-60 (1985).
122 Allman, Staying Alive in the 20th Century, SCIENCE 85, Oct. 1985, at 31, 35.
123 Russell, Risk vs. Reality: How the Public Perceives Health Hazards, Wash. Post,
June 14, 1988, at 14 (Magazine) (quoting Peter Sardman, head of the Rutgers
University environmental communication research program in New Jersey).
124 See W. LOWRANCE, supra note 93, at 86-94.
125 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk, supra note 119, at 243; see
also Fisher, Chestnut & Violette, The Value of Reducing Risks of Death: A Note on New
Evidence, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 88, 97 (1989) (noting that for many people
"the way of dying is important in addition to the probability of dying").
126 See, e.g., C. PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES 324-28 (1984) (comparing public and expert perceptions of risk and
concluding that "dread" is the best predictor of perceived risk among lay people);
Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Rating the Risks, supra note 93, at 36 (finding that
"ratings of dread and severity along with . . . subjective fatality estimates" are
"closely related to lay persons' perceptions of risk"); Slovic, Fischhoff& Lichtenstein,
supra note 118, at 194 (noting that the risk judgments of lay persons can be
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Consider in this respect some research by cognitive psychologist
Paul Slovic and his colleagues on "riskiness" rankings - of activities,
substances, and technologies - by expert and nonexpert groups.1 2 7
As might be expected, the various groups' rankings differed. Experts
rated electric power, surgery, swimming, and X-rays as more risky
than did nonexperts. These same experts viewed nuclear power and
mountain climbing as less risky than did their nonexpert counter-
parts. 1 28 As might be expected, the expert rankings were relatively
consistent with statistical or calculated frequencies of death. Indeed,
the correlation was sufficiently strong that the report of the research
found it "reasonable to conclude that [the experts] both knew what
the technical [fatality] estinates were and viewed the risk of an activ-
ity or technology as synonymous with them."'' 29
The lay ratings of risk described above did not differ from those
of the experts simply because the lay subjects made inaccurate fatal-
ity estimates. To the contrary, when the investigators asked lay sub-
jects to estimate annual fatalities, they found "only a low to
moderate agreement between" lay fatality estimates and lay riskiness
judgments. Quite clearly, something other than mortality rates -
something omitted in the expert calculations - was motivating the
nonexperts. That "something," confirmed by Slovic and his associ-
ates in subsequent rankings with a fuller list of risks, comprised the
characteristics of catastrophe, involuntariness, unfamiliarity, and
severity discussed earlier.' °
When forced to do so, experts proved able to consider activities
in terms of these same characteristics, and then "the difference
between the experts and the public all but disappeared."''3 Yet
experts persistently ignored the factors when they shifted from risk
characterization to risk ranking.'1 2 For them, in the end, "a death is
a death."' 133 Their "perceptions of risk are not related to any of the
various risk characteristics or factors"' 34 so important to the
public. 1
35
"predicted almost perfectly from ratings of dread and severity, subjective fatality
estimates, and disaster multiplier.;").
127 See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 118, at 189-205.
'28 See id. at 190.
121) Id. at 192.
130 See id. at 194-205; supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131 C. PERROW, supra note 126, at 325.
132 See id.
133 Id. at 326.
134 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk, supra note 119, at 265.
135 See id.
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Disagreements between lay people and expert risk assessors
cannot be attributed to simple ignorance or ineptitude on the part of
either group. The divide, instead, results from fundamentally differ-
ent world views. For lay people, "'riskiness' means more ... than
'expected number of fatalities.'"136 For experts, it doesn't. The
implications of this split are hardly trivial. Given that risk means
more to ordinary people than a mere body count, expert assessments
of the high-technology hazards so prominent in the public risk
debate will commonly be understated when viewed from the popular
perspective, because lay assessments work up from the point at
which experts tend to stop - expected mortality and morbidity.'3 7
How might we resolve this difference in outlook, and the con-
flicting risk assessments that result? The easy way would be to reject
one of the opposing views as senseless or irrational. The expert per-
spective hardly deserves this treatment, as intuition alone makes
obvious: surely risk and its minimization have something to do with
actual human loss, measured in death and illness. The sense of body
counting is thus apparent. Some experts, though, are unwilling to
concede that more than bodies count, and that the lay view, too,
makes sense; they are generous only in their scorn. They take the
easy way and dismiss "the public's understanding" as "insane" at
worst, "irrational" at best."3 ' Their contempt, however, is utterly
unwarranted.
Rather than discuss why this is so, we could perhaps appeal once
136 Id. at 270.
137 See, e.g., Fischhoff, Svenson & Slovic, supra note 93, at 1094 (stating that
"nuclear power may be much more attractive when risk is defined as 'expected annual
fatalities' than when extra weight is given to losses of life from catastrophic
accidents"). But expert assessments will not invariably understate the public's
assessment. For example, one study found that experts view electric power and X-
rays as more risky than do lay people. See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Rating the
Risks, supra note 93, at 19.
138 See Slovic, supra note 118, at 285. Slovic quotes a "noted psychiatrist" who
referred to the "'irrational fear of nuclear power plants,'" and "a nuclear physicist
and leading advocate of nuclear power plants" who argued that "'the public has
been driven insane over fear of radiation [from nuclear power].'" The word
"insane," the physicist said, was used " 'purposefully since one of its definitions is
loss of contact with reality. The public's understanding of radiation dangers has
virtually lost all contact with the actual dangers as understood by scientists.' " Id.
(emphasis added); see also I. Hoos, supra note 93, at 289 (risk assessors and other
systems analysts "claim that theirs are the conclusions that are 'scientific' and
'rational,' while others, w'nict do not fit the model, are 'emotional' and 'irrational' ");
Otway, Experts, Risk Commuancation, and Democracy, 7 RIsK ANALYSIS 125, 126 (1987)
("Public fears were -often ridiculed as being 'irrational,' apparently because they
weren't expressible in technical jargon."). The idea that public attitudes about risk
are irrational runs throughout Huber's article. See generally Huber, supra note 3.
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again to intuition and leave the matter at that. Surely the characteris-
tics that rag at the popular mind have - like body counts - some-
thing to do with risk, hazard, threat.'19 It is worthwhile, however, to
move beyond the intuitive and state explicitly at least a few of the
arguments that support the lay understanding, partly because some
of the arguments undermine the contending expert conception.
Hence making out the case for the public's picture of public risk will
give us grounds to reconsider body counting. Our objective is not to
show that the popular perspective is best, though we happen to think
it is; our purpose, rather, is simply to establish it as an obviously
worthy and fully admissible point of view in the public risk debate.
Return, then, to the public's rich image of risk, and reflect for a
moment on its many dimensions. People have a lower tolerance for
involuntary than for voluntary exposure.' 4" Even on its surface, the
concern here is easily understood, and closely related to the dimen-
sions of uncontrollability and uncertainty. Voluntary exposure pre-
supposes knowledge. Knowledge coupled with freedom of action
facilitates individual choice and efforts to control events bearing on
the choice. To be forced to face a risk, on the other hand, or to be
ignorant of it, or to sense that no one is really in command of it,
leaves one's well-being in the hands of others, or of no one. Either
alternative is obviously inferior, under most circumstances, to being
in charge. 14
139 See, e.g., Otway, supra note 138, at 126 (research has shown "that there are
other, objective characteristics of risk besides death and injury which matter to
people (such as voluntariness, control, delay, catastrophic potential), and that it is
perfectly normal to care about them").
140 See Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk: What Is Our Society Willing to
Pay for Safety?, 165 Sci. 1232, 1237 (1969); see also Slovic, supra note 118, at 281-83
(discussing Starr's findings). There is some indication that the voluntary-involuntary
distinction actually serves as a proxy for other concerns, such as catastrophic
potential, dread, uncontrollability, and like factors discussed supra notes 124-37 and
accompanying text. See, e.g., Fischhoff, Svenson & Slovic, supra note 93, at 1111
(calling this a "double standards" phenomenon and noting that it is to be expected);
Slovic, Fischhoff& Lichtenstein, supra note 118, at 205-07 (concluding that "society's
apparent aversion to involuntary risks may be mostly an illusion, caused by the fact
that involuntary risks are often noxious in more important ways such as being
inequitable or potentially catastrophic").
141 This same concern motivates some of the literature on informed consent to
medical procedures. An expanded role for patients is justified not on the ground
that they are better able to make medical decisions than are licensed physicians, but
rather because patients are thought to be made better off- not just in the medical
sense - if they play some part in deciding what is to be done with, and to, their
bodies. See, e.g., Swartz, The Patient Who Refuses Medical Treatment: A Dilemma for
Hospitals and Physicians, 11 AM.J.L. & MED. 147,150 (1985) (noting in the context of
informed consent that the weighing of risks relative to an individual's fears and hopes
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Upon deeper examination, this sense of voluntariness might
trivialize the true concern. Suppose my situation (say I am an
unskilled worker) "forces" me to "choose" a risky occupation, in
exchange for some wage premium. Is my exposure to the risk "vol-
untary"? Suppose, more generally, that I rightly see life as full of
difficult choices. Is it sensible to say that, given my power to choose
- given that any choice is "voluntary" - I should accept without
complaint whatever consequences follow? The answer might be yes
if the world were organized in a way consistent with ideal values and
principles, but it is not. Behind the notion of voluntariness, then,
there may lurk more fundamental concerns about autonomy and
equality and power among individuals in the society, for it is the pre-
existence of these that lets free choice be morally interesting. People
perhaps are saying that some risks seem consistent with such ideals
and others not, and registering the view by showing a greater accept-
ance of risks that they regard as "voluntary" in fundamentally impor-
tant ways, as opposed to "chosen" in some narrower sense. 142
The foregoing account enlightens us about other popular
dimensions of risk, such as the enhanced dislike of delayed (latent)
effects, and of irreversible ones. Latency frustrates knowledge, and
irreversibility frustrates control. They make it more difficult for us to
govern our own circumstances - and also to govern our governors.
How do we hold accountable officials whose mistakes or misdeeds
manifest themselves only decades after a term of office? And how do
we correct for what they have done, if what they have done is uncor-
rectable? Latency and irreversibility practically deny us the fruits of
trial-and-error, perhaps the best means yet devised by which to
resolve uncertainty.
143
What of the special dislike of manmade as opposed to natural
hazards? Once again, a story grows out of what has been said thus
far: Humans might treat each other with motives that Nature could
never have, and this matters. Mark Sagoff develops this theme in the
course of considering why the government should regulate artificial
is not an expert skill); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632,
1646 (1974) ("Only the patient knows sufficiently his own value preferences, capacity
for pain and suffering, future business and social plans, and religious beliefs to
evaluate the desirability of a particular treatment so it will maximize the patient's
satisfaction.").
142 See M. Sagoff, Technological Risk: A Budget of Distinctions 2-7 (1986)
(unpublished manuscript); see also Anderson, supra note 27, at 60-63 (contrasting the
self-understandings of workers with the picture of them presupposed by cost-benefit
analysis).
143 See infra notes 265 & 266 and accompanying text.
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risks more strictly than natural ones, even if they are "no more dan-
gerous" (obviously, in the sense of body counting). First, people are
responsible for artificial risks, but not for natural ones, and the gov-
ernment's job is to regulate what people do. Second, only manmade
risks can, in any meaningful sense, threaten autonomy, an additional
reason to be especially wary of them. Third, the harms we suffer
because of the acts of others carry special injury; we mourn the
deaths from a natural flood. but resent, deeply, the ones from a bro-
ken dam. We "are concerned not simply with safety but with respon-
sibility and guilt as well."' 4
These same concerns arise in the case of those manmade risks
we and others classify as "public": risks generated by highly central-
ized high technologies. The is especially so because public risks
entail so much uncertainty (given their complexity), imply such con-
siderable power, and are capable of such calamitous effects. The last
consideration, in particular, implicates the public's aversion to the
possibility of disastrous consequences and brings us to the cluster of
factors that enter into what is termed "dread." Dread correlates sig-
nificantly with some aspects of risk that we have already discussed,
such as involuntariness and uncontrollability, but also with such
others as inequitable distributions, threats to future generations, and
catastrophic potential 14 5 -. each of which speaks almost for itself.
The idea of inequitable distributions, for example, reflects the
view that just as a right thinking society should concern itself with
the distribution of wealth, so too should it do so with the distribution
of risk. For example, risks that might result in death or disease are
often considered worth taking because they confer significant bene-
fits not otherwise available. This risk burden may be regarded as
equitably distributed only iF it is borne by those who simultaneously
enjoy the benefits. Burdens imposed on others, or diverted to future
generations, generate worries about exploitation. Alternatively, risks
concentrated in time and space might be regarded as inequitable or
otherwise unacceptable because concentration can result in losses
that are avoided by broader distributions. This suggests, then, a link
between inequitable distributions and catastrophic potential. Con-
centrated risks can threaten whole communities, and the loss of a
community (think of Love Canal, of Chernobyl) is the loss of a val-
144 M. Sagoff, supra note 142, at 15. On the resentment that built up after the
disaster at Buffalo Creek, see K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF
COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 177-83 (1976).
145 See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 118, at 199-200.
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ued thing distinct and apart from the disaggregated bodies of a com-
munity's citizens.
Imagine, for instance, a decision maker who is forced to choose
between two actions. The first action poses a 1 in 1000 chance of
causing 100,000 deaths spread randomly across the country; the sec-
ond has a 1 in 1200 chance of causing the near obliteration of a city
of 100,000. A rational decision maker could obviously select the first
alternative, notwithstanding its larger expected loss. Either action
could cause physical injuries, the end of families, grief among survi-
vors. Only the second, though, would provoke the "collective
trauma" of disasters that wipe out neighborhoods and entire net-
works of relationships - losses that cannot be measured merely in
terms of lives and property destroyed.' 4 6 The possibility of catastro-
phe, then, is clearly material to choices among risks. Aversion to cat-
astrophic losses is also consistent with the commonplace observation
that people are regularly willing to pay a premium in order to soften
the blow of very costly (but very unlikely) events. 147 Ordinarily this
insurance premium is paid in dollars, but it is exactly the same thing
to pay the toll of a statistically given number of deaths in order to
avoid the chance, though small, that a great multitude of deaths will
otherwise occur. Simple body counting - a death is a death is a
death - denies the chance to buy insurance against an uncertain
future.
Several revealing exercises suggest additional reasons to appre-
ciate the public's vision of public risk. Fischhoff, Svenson, and Slovic
consider how one might calculate the value of a life, and hence of a
death. The loss of a first life might be taken as of extraordinary sig-
nificance - it might mark "an enormous watershed, making the
technology lethal and the society that accepts it callous. Subsequent
deaths have increasingly little effect, either on society's functioning
or on its moral stature." 48 Plotting this on a graph with social cost
on the vertical axis and number of lives lost at one time on the hori-
zontal results in a concave curve that attaches decreasing value to
each additional life lost. Conversely, the view might be that some
early losses are tolerable, because risk cannot be obliterated. But
even though society must "accommodate some losses," the judg-
ment might still be that "it cannot absorb very large accidents. An
energy technology that is expected to kill 10 people per GWyr
146 See generally K. ERIKSON, supra note 144; Rabin, Dealing with Disasters: Some
Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1978).
147 See W. ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK 152-56 (1977).
148 Fischhoff, Svenson & Slovic, supra note 93, at 1106.
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[Gigawatt year] on the average probably does that by, say, killing
1000 once in every 100 GWyr - an intolerable possibility." '149 The
curve reflecting this judgment would have a convex slope, indicating
an increasing value to each additional life lost. If, finally, all lives
were regarded as equal whatever the circumstances, there would
result a straight line drawn at an angle of forty-five degrees from the
origin. 50 Simply note for now that expert risk assessors would
choose this last function, although it is only one among a set of
equally sensible alternatives."'
As another way of seeing the same point - that not all
(expected) deaths, and lives, are obviously equal - consider Douglas
MacLean's game of Russian roulette, played with six players (forced
to participate) and six six-shooters and six bullets (the same,
probabilistically, as the familiar game played with one pistol and a
single bullet). The six bullets can be distributed in any manner
among the six pistols; then one pistol could be selected at random
and fired once at each of the six players, or all six pistols could be
distributed by lot, one to each person, each of whom spins the cham-
ber and fires once. There are, according to MacLean, about four
million variations on the game, with a rich array of outcomes, rang-
ing from one certain death, but no others, to the possibility that no
one will die, to the possibility that all will die, with many probabilities
of zero through six deaths distributed in between. The responsibility
of choosing which game to play would seem to present an extraordi-
nary quandary, but not for expert risk assessors. One choice or
another, it's all the same to them - because the ex ante risk of death
to each player is always one in six. 152
Let us reconsider this expert definition of risk as equal to
expected fatalities. We said earlier that the sense of the definition is
apparent, because fatality data are obviously material to the measure
of risk. But should they ever be so conclusive as expert practice
would have them? A negative argument could start (and perhaps
end) by observing the remarkably meager image projected by stark
death data. The picture lacks details that so clearly seem to matter.
Laurence Tribe has expressed this shortcoming in terms of the pro-
fessional risk assessor's habit of "dwarfing soft variables." Yet this
understates the matter, because soft variables and "fragile values"
149 Id. at 1106-07.
1-50 See id. at 1106-07 & Fig. 29.7.
151 See supra notes 9 & 116-37 and accompanying text.
152 See MacLean, Social Values and the Distribution of Risk, in VALUES AT RISK 75,
78-85 (D. MacLean ed. 1986).
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are not simply dwarfed, they are ignored - as Tribe proceeds to
recognize. The difficulty, he says, "goes deeper" and amounts to
"reducing entire problems to terms that misstate their underlying
structure, typically collapsing into the task of maximizing some sim-
ple quantity."' 53  Others have made the same point. Douglas
MacLean, for example, wonders whether risk analysis as profession-
ally practiced can "adequately subsume or encompass all our values,
across the board."' 5 4 The problem is "that whatever metric is used
to measure or compare values will introduce distortions and leave
some values out of account."' 55 So "if we report the expected con-
sequences of a decision as the average risk per person, there are
many ways in which importantly different consequences will look
equivalent"' 56 when on any sensitive view they are not.' 57
None of these difficulties is a secret, least of all to risk assess-
ment enthusiasts. In the course of defending the "philosophy and
legitimacy" of quantitative approaches to risk, for example, Herman
Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser readily concede that "some costs
and benefits tend to be ignored because they are much more difficult
to measure than others."'15 8 But to the charge that risk assessment
methodology is "systematically biased toward consideration of the
quantifiable aspects of decisions," their plea is confession and avoid-
153 Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 96-97
(1972).
154 MacLean, Introduction to VALUES AT RISK 3, 3 (D. MacLean ed. 1986).
155 Id. at 4.
156 Id at 7.
157 See id. at 3-5, 7; see also T. NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 137 (1979) (examining
the shortcomings of "exclusionary overrationalization" in a general setting, and
mentioning the dangers of dismissing all considerations that cannot be rendered in
quantitative terms); Anderson, supra note 27, at 54, 56, 64 (observing that "market'
mechanisms are insensitive to many ethical distinctions which we should and do
make in deliberating about risk," and wondering why life and health should be
treated "as mere commodity values" and why such concerns "as how the social
relations within which ... risks are imposed and controlled should be changed, are
left out of account"); Tribe, supra note 153, at 97 (discussing the manner in which
systems methodology anesthetizes moral feeling, referring in particular to how
"talking of gruesomely burned human beings as part of a 'body count' [during the
Vietnam War] hideously masks the truth"). None of these remarks should be taken,
however, to suggest that the information (commonly quantitative) generated by risk
assessment and related methodologies is irrelevant. The point, rather, is that the
information should not be regarded as exclusively relevant, or even of dominant
importance.
158 Leonard & Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and
Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 43 (D. MacLean ed. 1986). The admission reveals
more than might have been intended by its reduction of eveiything to merely "costs
and benefits."
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ance. "This is unquestionably true," they say,' 5 9 but not particularly
interesting because no one seriously maintains that something like
risk assessment should be "the sole or final arbiter of public
decisions." 160
Judging from their own account, though, Leonard and
Zeckhauser come perilously close to maintaining exactly that. For
instance, with reference to distributional concerns (and in a once
again reductionist fashion) they say that "it is theoretically quite pos-
sible to build such concerns into [the analysis by] merely.., defining
carefully what is meant by a benefit or a cost."'' They conclude,
however, that this is not a "good idea"; distributional concerns
should be dealt with systematically, and not on a project by project
basis. Distribution aside, it would be acceptable to "give social val-
ues an appropriate role," presumably either by building them into
"benefits and costs" or by having them somehow straddle the ana-
lytic process. Under the latter approach, "[w]idely held and vitally
important social values" could "trump" the results of quantitative
exercises, but "we must be very careful that only genuinely impor-
159 Id. at 43.
160 Id. at 34; see also id. at 38 (arguing that quantitative analysis "is surely not a
complete guide for social decision-making").
Leonard and Zeckhauser concede that cost-benefit analysis (and, implicitly, risk
assessment as typically practiced) is biased toward the "quantifiable aspects of
decisions," but they consider the bias
ethically neutral unless it can be shown that the quantifiable
considerations systematically push decisions in a particular direction. In
other words, it is not sufficient to argue that cost-benefit analysis does not
handle perfectly what is obviously a very hard task; rather, its detractors
must show that its errors are systematically unjust or inefficient - for
example, that it frequently helps the rich at the expense of the poor, or
that the environment is systematically disadvantaged to the benefit of
industry. We have not seen any carefully researched evidence to support
such assertions.
Id. at 43-44.
But why should the burden of proof be on the detractors? If we begin with the
proposition that quantitative methodologies are incomplete from the standpoint of
social values, then should not those who defend the methodologies show, with "care-
fully researched evidence," how this incompleteness is inconsequential? And in any
event, why should we assume that i he absence of systematic errors, in the sense used
by Leonard and Zeckhauser, somehow results in a benign cancelling-out of mistakes?
Suppose, for example, that two erroneous decisions are made, one of them adversely
afficting some wealthy people and the other adversely affecting some poor people. If
different wealthy and poor people are implicated in the two decisions, we can hardly
conclude that the mistakes cancel out. But even if the same people are involved in
each instance, we can hardly conclude, without much more information, that the two
wrongs make a right.
161 Id. at 39.
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tant and relevant social values be permitted to outweigh the findings
of an analysis."
1 62
This sounds begrudging. If expert risk assessors share the atti-
tudes of Leonard and Zeckhauser (a reasonable assumption), then
we see little reason to suppose that they would, if left to their own
devices, take much notice at all of the so-called social values, other
than in the course of rationalizing them out of the way. Even if they
did take notice, because they were supposed to, they would likely
diminish the values because they do not share them (and in fact
regard them as irrational).
Consider, for example, whether someone like Professor
Zeckhauser could take very seriously the public's concern with cata-
strophic potential. He recently addressed this dimension of risk in
an article (written with another co-author, Albert Nichols) on "the
perils of prudence."' 6 3 Framing the issue in terms of "Risk Aversion
and Risks to Society," the article poses as an example two alternative
pesticides and considers how a regulator should decide which is to
be allowed on the market (whichever is allowed, a million users will
be exposed). Pesticide A would cause about 10 extra cancers a year;
B has a 5 percent chance of causing 100 extra cancers annually and a
95 percent chance of causing none. "As pesticide B offers half the
expected number of cancers, any rational individual would prefer to
be exposed to B. Nevertheless, some believe that society should
choose A on the grounds that, ignoring the probabilities, fewer peo-
ple would die if the worst case were to result."' 64 The article contin-
ues by stating that this argument
is made most often in the context of nuclear power plants, which
pose the risk of a major catastrophe albeit with extremely low
probability .... The rationale is that the simultaneous death of
1,000 people in the same incident is somehow worse than the iso-
lated deaths of 1,000 otherwise identical people in separate inci-
dents. We are extremely skeptical of such views. Although it is
clear that a single large accident attracts more public attention and
concern than the same number of fatalities reaped one or a few at a
time, it is far from obvious that the total loss is greater. 1
65
162 Id. at 42.
163 See Nichols &,Zeckhauser, supra note 121, at 22-24.
164 Id. at 23.
I15 Id. at 22. A public worried about catastrophic potential and the cluster of
concerns gathered under "dread," see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text,
would fare just as poorly if they had for their risk assessor someone like Mr. Huber,
who shows considerable disdain for concepts like "ominous, major, "grave," and
"irreversible" consequences. Anything, after all, can entail those consequences. "A
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Perhaps, but it is also far from obvious that it is not. We have
already seen that catastrophes can generate special concerns and
reactions.' 6 6 They can also trigger a desire to avoid the worst case
scenarios referred to by Nichols and Zeckhauser, even where avoid-
ance might produce a higher expected death rate than some alterna-
tive. When Nichols and Zeckhauser refer to people who would
choose pesticide A "on the grounds that.., fewer people would die
if the worst case were to result,"' 6 7 they are unsympathetically allud-
ing to a common, and perfectly sensible, aversion to the regret one
might come to feel about some decision. From this standpoint, it is
not at all irrational to act in a way that minimizes the maximum pos-
sible regret that could follow from an action, given all possible states
of the world.' 6 ' Choosing pesticide A in the Nichols-Zeckhauser
example would accomplish that objective.
Why are body counters so insistent (and defensive) about their
method? We can imagine any number of reasons, all of them plausi-
ble and some of them relatively innocent. They might have a com-
mitment to a particular brand of titilitarianism. Less grandly, they
might merely wish to keep doing what they do best, and to realize
some return from the time, money, and effort they devoted to learn-
ing it.16 9 They might sense and enjoy the power and privilege that
accompany their method, inaccessible as it is to ordinary people.
They might have a hidden ideological agenda - whether about
something as general as the structure of a well-ordered society or
about something as specific as the virtues of modern technology -
and favor their approach because they think it promotes the
new bathtub filled with water 'threatens' 'grave' environmental consequences too; in
a 'worst conceivable' accident the citizens of the nation might line up in front of the
tub and drown themselves, one at a time." Huber, supra note 3, at 312-13. For a far
more credible treatment of this "doomsday scenario" argument, see Stich, The
Recombinant DNA Debate, 7 PHIL. &: PUB. AFF. 187, 189-91 (1978).
166 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
167 Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 121, at 23.
168 See K. ARROW, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking
Situations, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE UNDER
CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 5, 32-34 (1984); K. BORCH, THE ECONOMICS OF
UNCERTAINTY 82 (1968); Bell, Risk Premiums for Decision Regret, 29 MGMT. SCI. 1156,
1165-66 (1983); Loomes & Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 820-23 (1982).
169 See, e.g., I. Hoos, supra note 93, at 128-29 (arguing that experts value
technical virtuosity, without much regard for the larger value of their exercises);
Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk, supra note 119, at 273 ("Even
experts' understanding may be incomplete; indeed, their professional training may
have limited them to certain traditional ways of looking at problems.").
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cause. 170 They might regard quantitative assessment, whatever its
shortcomings, as essentially more rational, and thus better, than any
alternative. 171 Most likely of all, they no doubt see that some elegant
numeraire, such as expected annual fatalities, is absolutely essential
to the precise comparative assessments that they (but not others)
regard as so informative. The multiple dimensions of the public's
image of public risk simply do not lend themselves to convenient
reduction and mechanical manipulation.'
7 2
Whatever its motivations, the experts' approach to risk is obvi-
ously not senseless. Yet neither is the public's approach. This is why
we said in the introduction to this section that the problem comes
down to one of competing rationalities.' 73  Admit this, and it
unarguably follows that the choice of approach is an ethical and
political one that technical experts have neither the knowledge nor
the authority to dictate, because the issue transcends technocratic
expertise. Were we to defer to agencies simply on the basis of their
technical proficiency, the ethical-political question would be begged
entirely. Agencies could be expected to resort to methods the use of
which denies the very values at stake (it is, after all, the claim of
methodological proficiency that grounds the argument for deference
in the first place).' 7 4 And, to return to the idea with which we began
this section, methodological proclivities would bias agency risk
processing in the direction of too much public risk - as viewed from
the public's perspective.' 7
5  f
170 See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982) (arguing
that underlying social agendas color perceptions of risk).
171 See, e.g., Leonard & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 34 (defending a related
methodology, cost-benefit analysis, on the ground that "it is not perfect, but it is
better than the alternatives").
172 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 153, at 97 (noting that "quantitative decision-
making techniques are likely to bias conclusions in the direction of the considerations
they can most readily incorporate"). It appears that risk assessors particularly favor
some numeraire, or "unidimensional index" of risk (such as expected fatalities),
because this permits easy comparisons of hazards. The difficulty is that such risk
comparisons are not particularly satisfactory in the first place. See, e.g., Slovic, supra
note 118, at 285 (criticizing such comparisons as inadequate for measuring
acceptability of risk or improving perceptions of risk magnitude). But see Wilson &
Crouch, supra note 93.
173 See supra text following note 114; see also C. PERROW, supra note 126, at 315-
24 (discussing types of rationality).
174 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. On the proficiency of experts,
see infra notes 209-30 and accompanying text.
175, See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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D. Bias on Balance Again
Our discussion of the courts introduced the idea that two kinds
of bias (access and process) might affect judicial risk regulation,
examined the likely operation of each, and concluded that critics of
the courts have no reasonable basis for their confident charge that
the current liability system diminishes safety by deterring public risk
too much. Even if the courts process public risk claims in a very
stringent fashion, to stop the analysis there neglects the fact that
public risk victims have restricted access to this favorable judicial
treatment. If access bias promotes public risk, then process bias is a
kind of corrective that might help re-establish balance.' 76
The agency picture is different. In the judicial setting, access
and process bias almost surely cut in opposite directions. In the case
of agencies, however, they probably tend in the same direction, and
toward undue public risk (judged from the public's point of view).
Without externally imposed discipline, either capture or body count-
ing could, of itself, produce this result. Where the two work in con-
cert the result seems all the more likely.' 7 7 One need only consider
how neatly the expert definition of risk already fits the interests of
public risk producers,' 78 then simply couple with that the producers'
independent comparative advantage in bringing their views to
agency attention. Conversely, public interest victims are burdened
in their efforts to reach agencies, and should they manage to arrive it
is usually to a hostile reception. 179
The confluence of bias in the agency setting complicates the
institutional picture considerably. For example, suppose - contrary
to our own views - that the courts do in fact end up regulating pub-
lic risk too much. Evidence to that effect, even very convincing evi-
dence, would hardly be conclusive because agencies might well be
regulating, on balance, too little. Hence, even if the critics' charges
against the courts are justifiable, there remains the difficult problem
of figuring out whether, and to what degree, judicial stringency,
rather than representing overkill, serves instead to correct for
administrative laxity. At present, after all, both institutions regulate
176 See supra notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 113.
178 The expert definition fits the interests neatly because public risks generally
look safer in terms of expected fatalities than they do in terms of richer measures. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
179, Note, then, the irony of Huber's assertion that agencies can provide "a
'public' point of view on the problem" of public risk. See Huber, supra note 3, at 331.
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risk,'8 0 and there is some indication that risk producers are more
responsive to the threat of judicially imposed liability than they are
to agency regulation.' What are the concrete grounds for altering
the balance that presently exists in this larger judicial-administrative
system?
18 2
Consider finally the possibility that agencies regulate public risk
"too much" - in a sense very much like that developed in our
account of the courts.' Some students of the subject believe that
although agencies fail to control many risks that should receive
attention, they "overcontrol" the ones that do receive attention.'8 4
If so, the administrative system too may have a kind of self-correcting
mechanism, so long as the risk producers subjected to overcontrol
180 See Shavell, supra note 7; Viscusi, supra note 88.
181 See G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE
RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION at vii (1983). This Rand
Corporation study focused on nine large American manufacturers generally regarded
as safety leaders; it found that products liability law administered by the courts,
though generating an "indistinct signal," affects manufacturers' safety decisions far
more than do market forces or the prospect of regulation. See also Schwartz, Directions
in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 767 (1985)
(discussing the Rand study and noting that "[s]cholars who scrutinize appellate
opinions have argued, variously, that products liability law goes too far or does not
go far enough. Given the abstraction of this debate, there is strong value in gaining
some knowledge about how products liability doctrine actually operates on
manufacturer conduct").
182 A passage from an article by Professor Viscusi, a leading student of the
economics of risk regulation, inadvertently reveals how easy it is to confuse the ideal
with reality in doing comparative institutional studies. His views on the courts are
implicitly sympathetic to our own, yet they lead him to endorse, in an utterly
unexamined way, agency regulation of risk - because he imagines that agencies
"work."
One cannot rely on tort liability in lieu of regulation since product liability
incentives are ill-suited to the task. Not all injured parties file claims, and
court awards are far below what is required to promote efficient safety
incentives. In the case of fatalities, the courts' valuation of the
appropriate compensation for wrongful death is more than an order of
magnitude below the value of life that is appropriate from the standpoint
of injury prevention. Society should rely on regulation rather than tort liability to
address any market failures.
Viscusi, supra note 88, at 303 (emphasis added); see also supra note 92 (discussing the
idealization of administrative agencies).
183 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
184 See, e.g., J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION:
How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 3-4 (1988) (arguing that
overregulation of occupational risks from toxic subst~inces has generated resistance
to further regulation, the result being excessive controls in a few instances and
insufficient controls in many others).
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are drawn into the regulatory web essentially at random.' 85 Is this,
however, an argument for increased deference to agencies? The
idea underlying the argument would have to be that because agen-
cies end up sending out about the right signal and courts simultane-
ously send out an overstated one, the message emanating from the
larger (judicial-administrative) system deters, on balance, too much
public risk. But this is convincing only if courts do in fact overstate
matters (because, for instance, process bias swamps access bias).
Beyond this, one would have to establish that agencies would act in
the same fashion even if the courts were to treat agency decisions
more deferentially, and this is implausible. It is likely that agencies
act as they do now only because their actions are subject to judicial
scrutiny. After all, if expanded judicial deference to agencies would
simply result in their behaving substantially as they do at present,
then why would anyone bother to argue for more deference to agen-
cies in the first place?
E. Administrative Competence
We saw earlier how critics of the courts have failed to carry their
burden on the claim that thejudiciary is biased against public risk.' 8 6
We can see now how they also fall short in making their case for
administrative agencies: they fail to address too many of the consid-
erations that might lead agencies to be biased in exactly the opposite
direction. Still, though, we have to deal with comparative com-
petence.
Recall the charge that courts lack the technical competence and
institutional capacity thought to be essential to successful risk assess-
ment and management, the assertion that expert administrative
agencies are much better equipped in these respects, and the conclu-
sion that, for these reasons, "courts should defer to the experts." 187
Our discussion of judicial competence more or less conceded that
the judiciary is not particularly adept at technical exercises, but won-
dered whether agencies might be less than entirely competent them-
selves. 1' Let us now consider some of the grounds for our
skepticism.
We saw earlier that risk assessment and management require a
185 Random (unpredictable) overregulation forecloses strategic behavior on the
part of risk producers. See supra note 82.
186 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
187 Huber, supra no. z 3, at 333; see also supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
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great deal ofjudgment, particularly in the case of new or especially
complex technology - the sort of technology that is most at issue in
the public risk debate.'8" Judgment and intuition are essential to the
process simply because the risk sources are new and complex. Their
novelty reduces the value of history and experience; their complexity
demands something more than simplistic analysis, yet confounds
efforts to be perfectly thoroughgoing. Practical lines must be drawn.
So, addressing the particular case of nuclear reactor mishaps, Slovic,
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein observe that "[t]he technology is so new
and the probabilities in question are so small that accurate risk esti-
mates cannot be based on empirical observation. Instead, such
assessments must be derived from complex mathematical models
and subjectivejudgments." '19  "Someone, relying on educated intui-
tion, must determine the structure of the problem, the consequences
to be considered, and the importance of the various branches of the
fault tree."1
9
'
How "educated" can intuition be in cases of the new and the
complex - whether the problem is to determine the probabilities of
events that have never happened, gauge their consequences if they
do happen, or figure out how to build in safeguards against them? 192
Here, intuition amounts to speculation, as even the champions of
expertise seem ready enough to admit. Peter Huber, for example,
discusses at considerable length the difficulties of risk assessment in
the case of "diffuse, low-probability, multi-lateral, and temporally-
remote harms."' 93 He characterizes the task as "difficult, often spec-
ulative, and always time-consuming"; 9 4 he calls excess risk "a very
189 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
190 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears, supra note 93, at 486.
191 Id. at 463.
192 For example, Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, discussing nuclear reactors,
write:
One major concern is that important initiating events or pathways to
failure may be omitted, causing risks to be underestimated. Another
problem in assessing the reliability of reactor designs is the difficulty of
taking proper account of "common-mode failures," in which ostensibly
independent systems designed to back up one another fail because of the
same unanticipated common cause.
Id. at 486; see also Hacking, Culpable Ignorance of Interference Effects, in VALUES AT RIsK
136, 143-54 (D. MacLean ed. 1986) (interference effects refer to interactions among
new technologies, as opposed to the interactions of a technology with the pre-
existing environment - a side effect); MacLean, supra note 154, at 12 (discussing
ignorance of "interference effects").
193 Huber, supra note 3, at 331. See generally id. at 320-26 (discussing the
difficulties associated with methods of public risk analysis).
194 Id. at 320.
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elusive quantity";195 and he describes his ideal of comparative risk
assessment as "more difficult than it may first appear,"' 96 "an exer-
cise" fraught with . . . uncertainties and ambiguities,"' a9 7 a task of
"extraordinary complexity."' 9 s
Huber's purpose in presenting this litany is to support his admo-
nition that we should defer to agency experts. Who but an expert
could possibly cope with the rigorous demands of risk assessment?
Ironically, though, Huber's dreary account tends to cut in a direction
exactly opposite to that intended. Consider first how his argument
for agency expertise stumbles over its own premises. He insists that
we should respect not any old expert (say one a court might appoint
to serve as a special master or technical consultant), but only the
experts employed by regulatory agencies, because "[t]he scientific
community is large and heterogeneous, and a Ph.D. can be found to
swear to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or fool-
ish."' 99 This is rather clearly troublesome, since we haven't a reason
in the world (none is given) to suppose that only true and not spuri-
ous experts happen to work for agencies.
But even assuming, purely for the sake of argument, that not a
single charlatan can find a place on the rolls of administrative per-
sonnel, there remains a second reason to be skeptical about agency
expertise. Stated most briefly and generally, experts, however
adroit, are merely human. They bear the burden of human limita-
tions. We alluded earlier to the growing literature that traces the
implications of some of these limitations in the case of administrative
and organizational behavior.200 We know from this literature that
classical models of fully "rational" decision making do not describe
how people actually behave. Even regulators who consciously and
conscientiously aspire to comprehensive analysis of all possible alter-
natives will fall well short of what they strive to achieve.20 1 Their
rationality is "bounded," such that optimal decisions are forgone in
favor of satisfactory ones. The "best" is sacrificed for what is "good
195 Id.
196 Id. at 321. On comparative risk assessment, see supra note 172.
197 Huber, supra note 3, at 322.
198 Id. at 323.
199 Id. at 333.
200 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., McGarity, The Role of Regulatory Analysis in Regulatory Decisionmaking,
in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 107, 208-12 (1985) (pointing out that even the supporters of
"rational" regulatory decision making acknowledge the limits of that process).
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enough 202 - even though the point at which the process stops
might lead to choices inferior to other, neglected options.20 3 These
are widely accepted views; to grasp their meaning in the specific case
of expert risk assessment and management requires elaboration.
Begin with some research in cognitive psychology. Many studies
suggest that people use a variety of shortcuts to cope with the sorts
of uncertainties involved in questions of risk. The most notable of
these are heuristics, rules of thumb "which reduce the complex tasks
of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmen-
tal operations. ' 20 4 Heuristics can be useful enough, "but sometimes
they lead to severe and systematic errors." 205 Consider, for exam-
ple, the representativeness heuristic, and imagine someone who faces
the problem of deciding whether to have her basement tested for the
presence of radon. Talking to neighbors and to friends around
town, she finds that a number of them have had their homes tested
and that only one test proved positive. According to the heuristic,
our subject is likely to determine that the probability of radon in her
basement is low - if she sees her situation as representative of that
of her friends and neighbors. If, on the other hand, most of the
others she talked to found radon in their basements, but she sees her
situation as not representative of theirs, she will again be likely to
regard the probability as low. In either case, of course, herjudgment
might be a good one, but it also might not be. The conclusion about
representativeness might be based on a stylized (stereotypical) and
misleading picture. Taking our first case (most others found no
radon), all of the basements might appear to be free of cracks. The
difficulty is that the basements of others could be well protected to
prevent radon from entering, whereas the subject's basement might
have hidden passages that permit entry, but no paths of exit. Taking
the second case (most others found radon), the subject might again
202 See J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (1958) (stating that an
optimal alternative presupposes that all other possible alternatives have been
considered).
203 See, e.g., Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65, 97-
98 (1983) (stating that "[s]electing the optimally precise form for a given rule"
requires qualities of human perfection inconsistent with the ordinary qualities of real
policy makers).
204 Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic &
A. Tversky eds. 1982).
205 Id. There is a considerable literature on heuristics. We draw our account
from the essay just cited, and from the larger collection of essays in the book by the
same name. For a very accessible account, see Heimer, Social Structure, Psychology, and
the Estimation of Risk, 14 ANN. REV. Soc. 491 (1988).
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observe that her basement is apparently flawless whereas the other
basements are full of obvious leaks and cracks. The difficulty here is
similar to that discussed above: the gas might enter and leave the
dwellings of others, but enter and stay in hers. Moreover, our sub-
ject should consider that the sample of people she talked to is very
small, and should check to see whether government reports indicate
a high or a low incidence of radon in her general vicinity. She should
understand that the average chance of finding radon in the average
basement is of itself not particularly informative.
Suppose that the subject has been taking her radon poll over the
course of a few years and. that early reports were favorable (no
radon) but more recent ones unfavorable, or vice versa. Suppose,
alternatively, that the poll results are favorable but that the local
newspaper has an occasional story about the presence of radon in
town. The availability heuristic suggests that these patterns will prob-
ably be meaningful, even though they probably shouldn't be. People
assess frequencies and probabilities in terms of the ease with which
instances come to mind, and this can be misleading. Recent reports
and reports from friends are likely to be more salient than earlier
ones 20 6 or ones read in newspapers, and hence come more immedi-
ately to mind; so too with detailed, concrete reports (a friend's long,
nervous, but ultimately relieving account; a newspaper story that is
very dramatic and also fresh) as opposed to abstract though arguably
more relevant ones.
A tendency opposite to that brought on by availability emerges
when we imagine, finally, that our subject concludes, based on early
results from her poll (and on other information she gathers), that the
probability of radon in her basement is extremely low. Now anchoring
can enter and bias subsequent calculations. Anchoring predicts that
the subject will have difficulty adjusting her initial estimate as con-
trary information comes to her attention.
Framing can also bias risk judgments, in that normatively incon-
sequential changes in the way a decision problem is formulated can
affect the problem's resolution. As an example,20 7 imagine a disease
206 But earlier events can at times be the more salient, such as when nostalgia
functions to bring events of long ago immediately to mind.
207 We draw our example from Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of
Risk, supra note 119, at 250-56. For a further discussion of framing, see Arrow, Risk
Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 6-7 (1982); Tversky &
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59J. Bus. S251, S255 (1986)
(presenting a decision problem that illustrates framing); Tversky & Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychoogy of Choice, 211 Sc. 453 (1981) ("Because of
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expected to kill 600 people, and two ways to combat the disease:
Program A, which will save 200 people; Program B, which has a
probability of .333 that 600 people will be saved and a probability of
.667 that no one will be saved. Problem 1: Which program should
one choose? Now change things slightly and consider two new pro-
grams - a Program C under which 400 people will die, and a Pro-
gram D with a .333 probability that no one will die and a .667
probability that 600 will die. Problem 2: Which program should one
choose? In a test conducted with college students, 72 percent chose
A over B in Problem 1, and 78 percent chose D over C in Problem 2.
Yet "the two problems are essentially identical. The only difference
between them is that the outcomes are described by the number of
lives saved in Problem 1 and the number of lives lost in Problem
2."P208
In all of the foregoing examples the judgments in question were
being made by lay people; but experts, too, use heuristics, 20 9 and
"[e]xperts'judgments appear to be prone to many of the same biases
as those of the general public, particularly when experts are forced
to go beyond the limits of available data and rely on intuition. ' 210
Experts, being human, are susceptible to the cognitive limitations
that burden all of us, and this is one reason why instances of expert
failure are so familiar to everyone. Huber reminds us of Bhopal.21 1
The Challenger and Chernobyl come naturally to mind. And case
studies of other events are easy to find: the accident at Three Mile
imperfections of human perception and decision .... changes of perspective often
reverse the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options.").
208 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk, supra note 119, at 252; see
also Silbergeld, The Uses and Abuses of Scientific Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T., Fall 1986, at 17, 19 (suggesting that bureaucratic decision
makers "are affected differently when confronted with a risk assessment depending
on whether it is stated as a probable incidence of 1:100(I0-) or as two excess deaths
per year"). Silbergeld concludes that the difference leads agencies to provide less
protection to people who are subjected to high levels of carcinogens but live in
sparsely populated areas than to people who are exposed to lower levels but live in
densely populated areas. See id. at 19.
209 Consider, for example, the two "rules of thumb" discussed supra note 11
and accompanying text.
210 Slovic, supra note 118, at 281; see also Fischhoff, supra note 117, at 91
("Available studies suggest that when experts must rely on judgment, their thought
processes resemble those of lay people."); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Rating the
Risks, supra note 93, at 38 (noting that "we have no assurance that experts'judgments
are immune to biases once they are forced to go beyond their precise knowledge and
rely upon their judgment," and that "[ajlthough judgmental biases have most often
been demonstrated with lay people, there is evidence that the cognitive functioning
of experts is basically like that of everyone else").
211 See Huber, supra note 3, at 277.
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Island; the breach of Grand Teton Dam; the circus that led to the
issuance of the Susan B. Anthony dollar.212 We mention these disas-
ters not to blame experts for making mistakes, nor to imply that
courts (or any lay body) could do better, or even as well. Mistakes,
including mistakes by experts, are inevitable in the face of virtually
impenetrable uncertainties, 21 3 and no doubt experts can perform
technical analyses of those uncertainties with a virtuosity that the rest
of us could never hope to achieve. Our point, rather, is that expert
competence nevertheless falls considerably short of the demands of
the very comprehensive rationality that experts would strive to serve,
and this matters in the choice of institutional arrangements. It mat-
ters especially if, by deferring to fallible experts, we create too much
public risk. Let us close this discussion by suggesting some reasons
why that might follow.
Even if agency exper:s make mistakes rather regularly, their
errors need not cut uniformly in the direction of undue risk. Experts
might, for example, overestimate relevant variables as often as they
underestimate them, miscalculate this way one time and that way
another, or overlook a bad thing but also a good thing. As a result,
there could be a rough balance between excessive risk in some cases
and excessive caution in others - a risk portfolio that manages to be
about right or even biased in the direction of safety.
The literature on heuristics and biases suggests, though, that a
picture like this might be too optimistic. A survey by Slovic,
212 See I. Hoos, supra note 93, at xxi-xxvi, 288-93; C. PERROW, supra note 126, at
15-31, 233-38; see generally H. PETROSKI, To ENGINEER IS HUMAN: THE ROLE OF
FAILURE IN SUCCESSFUL DESIGN (1985).
213 Robert Dahl has observed that when "uncertainties and trade offs .. . are
combined, the superior competence of experts diminishes to the vanishing point."
R. DAHL, CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEMOCRACY VERSUS GUARDIANSHIP 47
(1985). Dahl, of course, is not an expert (on matters of expertise), but he refers to
others who are. He cites Armstrong, The Seer-Sucker Theory: The Value of Experts in
Forecasting, TECH. REV., June-July 1980, at 18, an essay by J. Scott Armstrong,
"himself an expert on problems of long-range forecasting." R. DAHL, supra, at 98
n. 18. According to Armstrong's seer-sucker theory, " 'No matter how much evidence
exists that seers do not exist, suckers will pay for the existence of seers.' "
Armstrong, supra, at 19. Despite the whimsical tone, Armstrong's message is a
serious one. His conclusion, based on his own professional work and on studies by
others in such fields as psychology, economics, medicine, sports, and sociology, is
that expertise (beyond a very minimal level) and accuracy are unrelated and perhaps
even inversely related. The particular kind of expertise addressed by Armstrong
concerned forecasting (of, for example, stock market performance, human behavior,
and public opinion), but not the forecasting of risk, and he concedes that his theory
might not hold in all cases. See id. at 19-21. But he considers it "wise to put the
burden of proof upon the experts to show that their expertise in a given area is
valuable." Id. at 24.
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Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, for example, says that a "particularly
pernicious aspect of heuristics is that people typically have great con-
fidence in judgments based upon them"; more to the point,
"experts, once they are forced to go beyond their data and rely on
judgment, may be as prone to overconfidence as lay people." ' 4
And overconfidence in the case of risk assessment might tend sys-
tematically in the direction of too much risk because one of its com-
mon manifestations is insensitivity to incomplete fault trees (trees
that omit important relevant information).2" 5 Even if fault trees are
complete, overconfidence can render them dangerous. One example
is the Grand Teton Dam. Subsequent study attributed its breach "to
the unwarranted confidence of engineers who were absolutely cer-
tain they had solved the many serious problems that arose during
construction."2 " 6 A related but more notorious example is the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 1975 Reactor Safety Study (the
Rasmussen Report), where various probabilities on various branches
of the fault tree were badly underestimated.2 17 Subsequent review
of that assessment "concluded that despite the study's careful
attempt to calculate the probability of a core meltdown in a nuclear
reactor, 'we are certain that the error bands are understated.' ,218
Understatement resulted from an inadequate data base, poor statisti-
cal treatment, and inconsistent handling of uncertainties.21 9 As Ida
Hoos puts it, "[i]f ... one were to accept the assumptions of the
Reactor Safety Study, one would have to conclude that the accident
at Three Mile Island never occurred.- 22' But of course it did, thanks
214 Slovic, Fischhoff& Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears, supra note 93, at 472, 475.
215 See id. at 475. Slovic and his colleagues go on to list "common ways in which
experts may overlook or misjudge pathways to disaster," for example: "[f]ailure to
consider the ways in which human errors can affect technological systems" (the
example given by the authors is Three Mile Island); and "[flailure to appreciate how
technological systems function as a whole" (an example given by the authors is dams,
which make flooding less frequent but for this very reason promote development of
flood plains, with the result that "although floods are rarer, damage per flood is so
much greater that the average yearly dollar loss is larger than before the dams were
built"; the authors add that "[f]ailure probabilities are typically not even calculated
for new dams even though about 1 in.300 fails when the reservoir is first filled"); and
"[flailure to anticipate 'common-mode failures,' which simultaneously afflict systems
that are designed to be independent" (the example given by the authors is the
nuclear reactor at Browns Ferry, Alabama, where a single fire damaged all five of the
reactor's emergency core cooling systems because the electrical cables controlling
the multiple systems were not spatially separated). See id. at 477-78.
216 Id. at 477.
217 See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk, supra note 119, at 248.
218 Id.
219 See id.
220 1. Hoos, supra note 93, at 290.
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to expert overconfidence. John Kemeny, the mathematician who
chaired the presidential commission that studied the Three Mile
Island incident, later said:
In the course of our commission's work, we again and again ran
into cases where emotions influenced the judgments of even very
distinguished scientists.... I kept running into scientists whose
beliefs border on the religious and even occasionally on the fanati-
cal .... These people distort their own scientific judgments and
hurt their reputations by stating things with assurance that they
know, deep down, could only be assigned small probabilities. They
become advocates instead of unbiased observers.
22 1
As for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - one of the expert
agencies whose judgments some would have us accept deferentially
- Kemeny said that (as of' 1979) it "was a total disaster. It was
clearly not part of the solution but a serious part of the problem." 22 2
It published "tons" of unimportant regulations but ignored funda-
mental issues. It gave little attention to operator training, to inspec-
tion and enforcement. Ii "absolutely, literally ... had no systematic
way of learning from experience.- 2 23 Once again, overconfidence
was the root of the problem; the NRC was "an agency convinced that
the equipment was so foolproof that nothing bad could possibly hap-
pen; they therefore honestly believed that whatever they were doing
was sufficient to assure nuclear safety. -224
It isn't difficult to find this same mindset among those who
argue on behalf of public risk, criticize the courts, and offer testimo-
nials to agency expertise. Mr. Huber, for example, is a prominent
voice on that side of the public risk debate, and he can also claim
more technical expertise than most of us. 2 25 So, addressing the issue
of liability limits for nuclear power plants and the position of those
who argue that the very claim for limits shows the hazards of the
221 Kemeny, Saving American Democracy: The Lessons of Three Mile Island, TECH.
REv.,June-July 1980, at 65, 70. We should add that Kemeny found the same attitude
at both extremes of the nuclear debate. See id.
222 Id. at 69.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 69. Huber, however, appears to have considerable faith in the NRC.
See Huber, supra note 3, at 334-35. More recently, others have voiced agreement with
Kemeny's 1975 assessment of the NRC. A recent review mentions "the failure to
resolve the basic institutional problems of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
despite the Kemeny Report." Linsione, Book Review, 27 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC.
CHANGE 438, 438 (1985).
225 In addition to a law degree, Huber has a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was for a time on the M.I.T.
engineering faculty.
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plants to be too high, he says that "[t]he argument is laughable.
Nuclear power, civil aviation, commercial drugs, and the like are
creatures of science and engineering, and their risks are therefore
both predictable and inherently self-limiting." '226 Contrast with this
the far more sober view of Henry Petroski, director of graduate stud-
ies in civil and environmental engineering at Duke University. In his
book, To Engineer is Human, Petroski shows that failure is a central
part of engineering and design, rather than something that engineer-
ing and design routinely limit or avoid. "IT]he truly fail-proof
design is chimerical, '22 7 Petroski writes. "The ways in which a struc-
ture or machine can fail are many, and their effects range from blem-
ishes to catastrophes." '228 New technologies in particular -
"departures from traditional designs" - "are more likely than not to
226 Huber, supra note 3, at 328-29. Ida Hoos found a remarkably similar
attitude upon reading an article promulgating the notion that nuclear power is
"even safer than engineers had presumed" prior to the accident at Three
Mile Island. Such presumption was based on what the author of the
article called "the concept and criteria behind the design safety of nuclear
reactors." These, he averred, resided in the "defense in depth
philosophy" which implied (a) the best quality assurance; (b) highly
redundant and protective systems; and (c) engineered safety systems.
I. Hoos, supra note 93, at 277 (citing Gilbertson, Nuclear: The Safest Energy Around,
FUSION, Sept. 1980, at 18). Hoos observes that "[e]xperience has shown that such
paper-drawn Maginot lines do not stand up well under the. pressure of reality." Id.
Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein identify yet another "pathway to disaster" as
"overconfidence in current scientific knowledge." Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein,
Facts Versus Fears, supra note 93, at 477. Experts, because they are highly trained,
quite naturally think they know much. Yet Robert Dahl observes that knowing much
necessarily means knowing little. "The specialization required in order to acquire a
high degree of expert knowledge is today inherently limiting: one becomes a special-
ist in something, that is, in one thing, and by necessity remains ignorant of other
things." R. DAHL, supra note.213, at 44.
In a sense, then, ignorance grows over time, as we can gather from any number
of different viewpoints. Mary Douglas, the anthropologist, and Aaron Wildavsky, the
political scientist, speak in their book on risk of "the double-edged thrust of science,
generating new ignorance with new knowledge." Science, they say, "has actually
expanded the universe about which we cannot speak with confidence." M. DouGLAs
& A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 170, at 49. And Thomag Kuhn, the eminent historian of
science, lends his own authority to the same proposition. "Though the bulk of scien-
tific knowledge clearly increases with time, what are we to say about ignorance? ...
Is it not possible, or perhaps even likely, that contemporary scientists know less of
what there is to know about their world than the scientists of the eighteenth century
knew of theirs?" T. KUHN, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research, in THE ESSENrrAL
TENSrON 266, 289-90 (1977).
227 H. PETROSKI, supra note 212, at 217.
228 Id.
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hold surprises." '229 Engineers do best when they go forth "without
hubris." 230
Attitudes, values, and ideology can color presumably objective
quantitative operations. 231 Experts proceed within the framework of
their education and training in particular disciplines, which are
replete (at any point in time) with given abstractions, principles, and
commitments. Experts learn within a setting of shared conceptions
that they come themselves to share, and this necessarily shapes, in an
extraordinarily durable way, their views of the world.232 The "facts"
experts observe are regularly "inseparable" from the "values" they
hold, "particularly when the facts in question refer to predictions of
likely consequences in a highly uncertain environment.- 231 Scien-
tific expertise can extend at best only to phenomena "that are deter-
ministic or whose probability of occurrence can itself be stated
precisely.... Events whose probability of occurrence is itself highly
uncertain [are in the domain of] trans-science." 234 In the realm of
trans-science, experts must be particularly cautious (and we particu-
larly cautious of expertise); their special knowledge should have no
229 Id. at 219; see also Kates, Success, Strain, and Surprise, ISSUES IN SCi. AND TECH.,
Fall 1985, at 46, 50-51 (despite the fact that minimization of surprise is a goal of risk
assessment, "surprise persists and, paradoxically, grows"; "[s]urprising hazards are
an inevitable outgrowth of technological change," and "[i]dentifying potentially
hazardous technologies may become more difficult because of a troubling
characteristic of the so-called high technologies .... the blurring of the roles of the
basic scientist, the technologist, and the entrepreneur," which "denies to hazard
management one of its strongest sources of early hazard identification -
knowledgeable but independent basic scientists").
230 H. PETROSKI, supra note 212, at 223.
231 See, e.g., T. KUHN, Objecivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in THE
ESSENrIAL TENSION 320, 329 (1977) (stating that "the choices scientists make
between competing theories depend not only on shared criteria . . . but also on
idiosyncratic factors dependent on individual biography and personality").
232 See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 11 (2d ed. 1970).
Misplaced scientific faith seems to have influenced the Swine Flu vaccine program of
the 1970s. See R. NEUSTADT & H. FEINBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-
MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE 86-103 (1978). Similarly, a recent history of atomic
science research meticulously documents the setbacks that developed because the
finest minds in the scientific community proceeded on the basis of conventional
assumptions. The scientists' commitments to prior theories led experimenters
confronted with evidence of neutral subatomic particles (neutrons) to ignore the
possibility that those particles could explain other inexplicable physical phenomena.
See R. RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 161-62 (1986). Similar
commitments blinded experimenters to the possibility of fission and led to false
hypotheses selected because they were more consistent with existing theories. See id.
at 247, 260.
233 Tribe, supra note 153, at 99.
234 Weinberg, Science and Its Limits: The Regulator's Dilemma, ISSUES IN SCI. AND
TECH., Fall 1985, at 59, 61.
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special weight. Yet, sensing this, experts must surely be tempted to
transport issues back into their own rightful world, thus giving rise
again to the problem of facts and values. Diverse training and expe-
rience will cause individual scientists to respond differently to similar
factors. A "scientist who believes that nuclear energy is evil because
it inevitably leads to proliferation of nuclear weapons," 23 5 for exam-
ple, will judge the same data differently than will "a scientist whose
whole career has been devoted to making nuclear power work."-236
To be sure, lay people too have ideologies, values, and world
views; hence they also have an agenda - though it might not be
quite so hidden as that of experts.237 When it comes to public risk,
there simply is no objective view, there are only "conflicts between
two sets of (inevitably subjective) judgments."23 8 This takes us back
to ground already covered. Because the conflicts in question are not
and cannot be objectively grounded, they cannot be resolved on
objective grounds. Much less should they be consigned to experts
whose competence lies in the technical arts. The question isn't
technical.
V. RISK, TECHNOCRACY, AND DEMOCRACY
A. A Summary
We began this Article with the observation that the public risk
debate proceeds along two lines, one concerning attitudes (should
public risk be feared, or should it be favored?) and the other institu-
tions (should courts be much involved with public risk regulation, or
should they defer to agencies?). These lines are necessarily tangled
together, but we tried to follow each separately, beginning with insti-
tutions. On the question whether judicial rule deters public risk
unduly, we concluded that given what we know now, the interplay of
235 Id. at 67.
236 Id. at 67; see also Nelkin, The Role of Experts in a Nuclear Siting Controversy, 30
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 29 (1974) (noting how experts on different sides of a
scientific issue emphasize different findings in support of their views); Note, The EPA
and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J. 553, 560-63
(1986) (stating that assumptions based on political and ethical preferences affect
scientific assessment).
237 See generally M. DouGLAs & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 170 (discussing the
ways in which particular groups select and evaluate different kinds of danger);
Cotgrove, Risk, Value Conflict and Political Legitimacy, in DEALING WITH RISK 122, 133
(R. Griffiths ed. 1981) (stating that differing views about political or social issues
affect risk perception).
238 Fischhoff, Svenson & Slovic, supra note 93, at 1097; see also supra note 114.
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access and process bias makes it very hard to say. On the matter of
judicial competence, we said an informed judgment turns on the
alternatives - in this case administrative rule - because courts
might be limited but then agencies might be too. So we turned to
agencies and considered some reasons, again having to do with
access and process bias, why they might end up regulating public risk
too little, and then considered how this might cut, on balance, in the
context of a larger regulatory system that includes courts and agen-
cies alike. Again, it's hard to say, but we are inclined to the view that
without substantial judicial intervention there would probably be too
much public risk. At the least, critics of the courts (and champions of
the agencies) simply have not carried their case. We went on to con-
sider the question of expert administrative competence, and found
little reason to alter this conclusion.
Much of our inquiry has, of course, been speculative, but it is
worth noting that the chain of argument can afford weak links. For
example, interest group capture is not essential to our critique of
agencies, because body counting could bias uncaptured agencies, as
could problems of competence and the limitations of expert rational-
ity. Each of these influences is probably powerful by itself. That
they might work in tandem only adds to our concerns.
The purpose of our examination of agencies and experts was
not, however, to show that they are plainly inferior to courts; the
point, rather, was to question the premises from which the argument
for deference to expertise proceeds and to show how proponents of
the argument have failed to carry their burden that agency rule
would be superior. The case for administrative superiority rests in
large part on selective idealization, but the lesson to be drawn from
capture, body counting, and bounded rationality is that administra-
tors, like judges, are prisoners of their own environment and victims
of their own human limitations. Agencies and courts alike proceed
episodically, the one pushed on by interest groups, the other by liti-
gants. Agencies and courts alike bring particular perceptions to
questions of risk. Agencies and courts alike cope with uncertainty in
a fashion far from perfect.
Even supposing agencies could be much better than they are at
what they do, we have suggested how they might nevertheless be
good at the wrong thing, resulting in more public risk than the pub-
lic, for its own sound reasons, wants. This recalls the debate about
attitudes and the question of what risk means. Until that question is
resolved, much of the ongoing debate about how to control public
risk is emphatically off the point. No one can talk sensibly about
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whether judicial control yields too little public risk, or administrative
control too much, without knowing how risk itself is to be conceived.
One conception might suggest one set of reforms, and the other
another. If, for example, risk is to be measured by body counts, then
agencies seem to have an advantage. But if risk means what the pub-
lic would have it mean, then agencies look to be remarkably limited
and courts much less so. 239 The courts are, after all, criticized in
part precisely because they accommodate the public's attitudes. A
purported liability ofjudges and juries - that they are not experts -
turns out to be an asset.
Without an understanding of what risk is to mean, we cannot
begin to answer the institutional questions that lie atop that basic
attitudinal puzzle. Yet even were the puzzle solved, and in favor of
the expert view, and even were we to concede all the alleged advan-
tages of expert control, still it might not follow that expertise pro-
vides the best route to safety, because expert control can give rise to
special dangers.
B. The Political Risks of Technocracy
In Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, the political theorist William
Ophuls draws a dark picture of a future that is to be avoided, if at all,
only by the exercise of extraordinary restraint. Briefly, he argues
that population growth, dwindling supplies of energy and other
resources, and increasing amounts of pollution promise an end to
the abundance that nourished political liberalism over the last
several centuries. No longer can technological advance be expected
to provide the easy solutions we have learned to take for granted; if
anything, technology aggravates the problem of ecological
scarcity.
240
This image, a familiar neo-Malthusian one, differs remarkably
from that found in a work like Peter Huber's Safety and the Second Best,
making it all the more troubling that Huber and Ophuls end up at
239 In addition to many obvious reasons for this observation, implicit in our
discussion, consider the fact that courts generally adjudicate risks that have
materialized rather than regulate risks that could materialize. This permits them to
reflect the public distinction between statistical lives and identifiable lives. Several
commentators have noted the tendency to expend resources to rescue individuals
whose welfare was not thought worth protecting ex ante. See G. CALABRESI & P.
BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 21, 221 n.2 (1978); Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your
Own, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 113, 115-19 (T. Schelling ed. 1984).
240 W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 116-27 (1977).
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the same place when it comes to the question of control. Each would
rely on management by experts. According to Huber:
Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk comparisons on
which all progressive transformation of the risk environment must
be based. The courts are simply not qualified to second-guess such
decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely make regres-
sive risk choices. Requiring - or at least strongly encouraging -
the courts to respect the comparative risk choices made by compe-
tent, expert agencies would inject a first, small measure of rational-
ity into a judicial regulatory system that currently runs quite
wild. 24 1
As for Ophuls, "the mounting complexity of technology along
with the staggering problems of managing the response to ecological
scarcity ... will require us to depend on a special class of experts in
charge of our survival and well-being - a 'priesthood of responsible
technologists.' "242 To be sure, the critical management decisions
will be " 'trans-scientific' in that they can only be made politically by
prudent men, [but] at least the basic scientific elements of the
problems must be understood reasonably well before an informed
political decision is possible." 24 3 Such decisions, hence, will be
beyond the capacity of the average citizen, who lacks the time, the
knowledge, and perhaps even the intelligence "to grasp the issues,
much less the important features of the problems." 2 44 The decisions
will also be beyond the gifts of ordinary politicians. "If we grant that
the people in their majority probably will not understand and are
therefore not competent to decide such issues, is it very likely that
the political leaders they select will themselves be competent enough
to deal with these issues? ' '2 45 Seeing the answer to be no, Ophuls
turns to Plato for instruction. "Plato argued that the polity was like a
ship sailing dangerous waters. It therefore needed to be com-
manded by the most competent pilots .... an elite class of guardi-
ans." 246 Ophuls concludes that "[t]he emerging large, highly-
developed, complex technological civilization operating at or very
near the ecological margin appears to fit Plato's premises more and
more closely, foreshadowing the necessity of rule by a class of Pla-
241 Huber, supra note 3, at 335.
242 W. OPHULS, supra note 240, at 159.
243 Id. at 159-60.
244 Id. at 160.
245 Id.
246 Id.
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tonic guardians, the 'priesthood of responsible technologists'
"247
While Huber and Ophuls seem to be in remarkable agreement,
there is nevertheless an important difference between the two. Only
Ophuls acknowledges the "profound political issues" 248 raised by
what he foresees. Society "will not only be more authoritarian and
less democratic than the industrial societies of today ... but it will
also in all likelihood be much more oligarchic as well, with only those
possessing the ecological and other competence necessary to make
prudent decisions allowed full participation in the political pro-
cess." 249 In a line, "democracy as we know it cannot conceivably
survive." 250
As it happens, Ophuls' account contains the seeds of its own
destruction, for scattered throughout the pages of his book are con-
vincing illustrations of the limits of technocracy. Robert Dahl has
recently pursued exactly this point in exactly Ophuls' terms in order
to remind us that reality cannot deliver on the Platonic Ideal. Guard-
ians possessed of the necessary instrumental knowledge and moral
virtue simply do not exist.
2 51
Suppose, however, that they did. Might the case for techno-
cratic control of public risk nevertheless fail even as (and because) it
succeeds? By definition, technocratic management would seem to
foreclose much meaningful participation by the public, 252 yet the
public's sense of alienation is at the core of the public risk problem.
Recall that "dread" is a term of art for the public's sentiments about
modem risks, and dread - as we saw - is itself a catchall for con-
cerns about a lack of control. 25 ' Given this, the program should be
not to alienate but to include the public. Let it decide what it shall
expose itself to, make it familiar with the exotic, give it control. 254
247 Id.
248 Id. at 161.
249 Id. at 163.
250 Id. at 152.
251 See R. DAHL, supra note 213, at 19-51.
252 One can, to be sure, imagine expert managerial forms nominally open to
public input, but the reality would likely be otherwise, if for no other reason than that
the very techniques by which questions are technocratically put and technocratically
resolved tend to exclude the laity from a meaningful role in a meaningful process.
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 153, at 82-83 (arguing that the policy sciences, by focusing
too exclusively on end results, ignore the important role played by process in human
experience). This, perhaps, is why Ophuls would simply bypass ordinary citizens
rather than invite them to participate in a charade.
253 Among other things. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
254 An alternative would be to educate the public - with policy makers striving to
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A growing body of literature advances just this view. Its authors
argue that the appropriate response to public risk is to democratize
the management process, specifically by increasing public participa-
tion.2 5 5 Because risk presents intractable problems and tradeoffs,
those placed at risk should have a role in deciding which games are
worth what candles. Just as participation in general is a means by
which individuals can exercise control over their political circum-
stances and reduce their sense of civic isolation,25 6 so participation
in the management of risk can reduce the sense of helplessness that
arises from involuntary exposure to hazards.
The idea behind participation, then, is not necessarily to
change lay attitudes about risk, rather than take them as given - and then give the
public a fuller participatory role. But the fundamental difficulty here should be
obvious. Why assume that it is the public's point of view that should be reformed to
resemble that of experts, rather than the other way around? As we saw, each outlook
has its own rational grounding, see supra notes 114-75 and accompanying text, so to
talk about education really begs the question of who should educate whom about
what. Education could amount to nothing but indoctrination, with experts striving to
lead the public away from its own legitimate concerns. And even at that, education
might accomplish little. See, e.g., Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in
Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 391-403
(D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) (reviewing evidence that even
improper linear models may yield predictions superior to the predictions of skilled
clinicians); see also id. at 391-459 (discussing "Corrective Procedures").
255 The idea, then, is to move beyond mere democratic representation. See, e.g.,
L. WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH
TECHNOLOGY 110-11 (1986); Anderson, supra note 27, at 63 ("The ideal of letting
people make decisions about life and health for themselves would be better realized
through institutions of democratic participation. The people who are placed at risk
should have the opportunity to participate directly in the decisions which affect
them."); Furrow, supra note 13, at 1422-36 (outlining the benefits of public
participation in risk management); Otway, supra note 138, at 126 (footnote omitted)
(democracy is "working poorly if all involved do not recognize the legitimacy of the
process and the right of each to participate. Since risk analysis first emerged in
response to controversy, and our main focus is on risks to the public, we should have
something to offer. I think we do, but not by developing yet more rational methods
of analysis (heaven knows, we have enough of them already), but rather by helping to
make these processes more democratic and, thus, more effective."); see also Fiorino,
Environmental Risk and Democratic trocess: A Critical Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501
(1989) (arguing for more effective procedures and mechanisms for citizen
participation in managing public risk).
Our brief discussion of democratic participation in this and the next section
introduces issues addressed in a body of literature too large to acknowledge in any
fashion that would give much guidance. Interested readers might, however, begin by
consulting, in addition to the works more particularly cited, B. BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); D. HELD, MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY (1987); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970);
Fiorino, Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis, 9 RISK ANALYSIS 293 (1989).
256 See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 272-73 (1963); C. PATEMAN, supra note 255,
at 22-44.
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improve the technical accuracy of risk decisions, but rather to
enhance the legitimacy of the decision making process.257 Given the
stakes in questions of public risk, it is easy to see why the public
should have an intimate role. And given that accuracy could actually
be served by a public presence - because responsible risk assess-
ment and management, however conceived, must depend to some
degree on what the public knows, values, and prefers - public par-
ticipation seems only the more appropriate.
C. The Environmental Risks of Democracy
The difficulty is that direct democratic participation poses spe-
cial problems in the case of public risk. One of the most challenging
items on the agenda of future debates will be to consider whether,
and how, we can nourish a fragile political system while simultane-
ously protecting a vulnerable environmental one.
Sensible risk regulation depends on an equally sensible grasp of
the risk situation. The skeptics are probably right that, on the techni-
cal side of the matter, little can be expected of the ordinary public. A
special feature of the problem arises from the heuristics and biases
that can influence risk judgments in counterproductive ways.25
True, lay person and expert alike are subject to these, 25 9 but there
seems to be little reason to suppose that participatory processes pro-
vide good means for filtering out cognitive errors, and some reason
to suppose they might aggravate them. Hence, there is the danger
that fuller participation will either generate undesirable results or, if
lay input is routinely ignored, disappoint public expectations.
Another problem has to do with exactly how participation is to
be realized. The arguments developed in the last section suggest
that the government itself should take an active role in expanding
the range of voices to be heard in the decision making process.
Those in power, however, might well be reluctant to do so. 2 6 0 Even
257 The argument is similar to that made for the value of participation in the
judicial process. See Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405,
406, 419-20 (1987); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U.L. REV. 885, 902-04 (1981) (linking self-respect to public participation and
arguing that increased self-respect encourages an even more active role in the
decision making process).
258 See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
260 A well-known instance to the contrary is the effort of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and William Ruckelshaus, then its Administrator,
to enhance public understanding and participation with regard to the continued
operation of the Asarco copper smelter in Tacoma, Washington. EPA estimates
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if they are not, we can imagine frustration. Earlier we considered at
some length the substantial. barriers that stand in the way of citizen
access to supposedly participatory processes. 26 ' These do not disap-
pear with the wave of a shibboleth about the importance of self-gov-
ernance. Yet measures designed to reduce obstacles to access -
whether subsidies or other alternatives - pose the danger of grant-
ing too much voice to too few interests. At bottom, the choice of
means by which to encourage participation calls itself for participa-
tion in the process of choosing, so the problem of access runs deep.
But a far deeper problem, we think, arises from the fact that
truly effective participation probably requires a considerable degree
of decentralized decision making and locally accessible decision
forums. 26 2 Public risk sources, however, typically call for highly cen-
tralized management. Their extraordinary power generates costs
and benefits, and effects and side effects, that commonly reach
beyond even the largest community and in some cases wrap around
the globe. Given this, the idea of local control seems unacceptable.
Decisions made in any one locality are likely to consider only paro-
chial interests, resulting on some occasions in too little public risk,
and on other occasions too much. Proceeding in an uncoordinated
fashion, some communities will protect their own backyards and
leave no place for risky but, from a larger perspective, beneficial
developments.2 6 3 Other communities will find ways to realize the
benefits of development while exporting its costs to neighbors (an
indicated that arsenic emissions from the smelter were causing four excess lung
cancer deaths per year, but the only remedy - closing the plant - would have
eliminated about 600 jobs. See Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENVrL. L. REP.
10,190, 10,192 (1984). Ruckelshaus was sensitive to what he called "the chemical
products and by-products of modern technology and the potential social disruption
associated with the processes we have created to control them." Id. at 10,190. He
concluded that the plant-closing decision should be preceded by a series of public
hearings, workshops, meetings with community leaders, and distribution of
information about relative risks. The idea was not to delegate an EPA decision to the
vote of the affected group, however, but rather to achieve informed deliberations. See
id. at 10,192. Reactions to the exercise were mixed. See, e.g., Reich, Public
Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1632-34
(1985) (describing the controversy provoked by the Tacoma incident); Rubin,
Environmental Policy and Environmental Thought: Ruckelshaus and Commoner, 11 ENVTL.
ETHICS 27, 48-49 (1989) (questioning whether the exercise accomplished anything).
261 See supra notes 55-75 & 106-09 and accompanying text.
262 For a discussion of this topic, and references, see Schill, Intergovernmental
Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 868-69
(1989).
263 See, e.g., Marks & von Winterfeldt, "Not in My Backyard": Influence of Moti-
vational Concerns on Judgments About a Risky Technology, 69J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 408,
408-15 (1984) (examining how people initially favorably disposed toward a particular
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example would be polluting factories using tall smoke stacks). Still
others will simply accept risks that their neighbors wish to avoid, but
in the nature of things cannot (a decision by one locality to accept a
toxic waste dump essentially negates the decision of a neighboring
community to reject the same project).
Finally, those who propose increased democratization of risk
management will have to confront the fact of democracy's historic
reliance on trial and error as a means of resolving uncertainty in the
course of making policy. The tendency to muddle through, as
Charles Lindblom called it in a well-known essay, 2 6 4 is a common-
place to close observers of American politics.2 6 5 A chief virtue of the
method, which relies on trial-and-error to promote incremental
learning, is its capacity to resolve uncertainty simply by the simple
act of acting, even if the action is mistaken. 26 6 In the case of public
risks, however, muddling is also fraught with vices. The reactive
technique of trial-and-error is useful only to the extent that informa-
tion generated by one (successful or unsuccessful) experiment can
be considered and exploited in a subsequent one. But with many
public risks, the potential to learn from error is simultaneously the
potential to bring about catastrophic consequences. Errors might in
any event be of little educational value, thanks to latency. Latency
means that what we learn, we learn late. This promotes irreversibil-
ity and limits opportunities to corect mistakes through a relatively
quick series of many trials.
There are reasons, then, to avoid a participatory, incremental,
trial-and-error method of muddling in favor of holistic, systematic,
"synoptic" methods of expert comprehensive analysis (perfectly rep-
resented by quantitative risk assessment). These are said to be pref-
erable when "small errors in policy can cause irreversible or even
technology often become hostile toward it when it encroaches on "their own back
yard").
264 See Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959); see also Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517
(1979) (supporting incrementalism because neither revolution nor drastic policy
change, nor even planned large steps, are ordinarily possible).
265 See, e.g., J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 133-34 (1983); W. OPHULS, supra note 240, at 191-
93 (describing "muddling through" as the decision making style characteristic of all
our institutions).
266 See, e.g., J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 58, at 287-95 (discussing the
constructive role of incremental learning in the formation of air pollution policy);
Diver, Policy Making Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 399 (1981)
(discussing incrementalism as a process of remedial adjustments made in reaction to
errors).
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catastrophic harm."267 Unfortunately, however, the synoptic meth-
odology is itself troublesome, on a number of grounds. First is the
widely accepted opinion that it depends on "firmness of data and
consensus on goals" 268 - things hard to come by in the case of pub-
lic risks. Second is the problem of latency, which might well affect
even the incentives of expert analysts. Consider, for example, the
mundane point that weather forecasters are regarded by careful stu-
dents of such matters as being among the very best and most reliable
of prognosticators. There are, no doubt, technical and technological
reasons for this, such as regular advances in meteorology and the
development of orbiting satellites, but there is also the intriguing
fact that weather prediction is performed in such an elegant system
of almost instantaneous meaningful feedback. Bad weather-folk sim-
ply don't survive.2 6 9 In the case of bad public risk assessors, though,
latency frustrates the forces of natural selection that might otherwise
help eliminate poor assessors and managers. By the time their errors
are discovered, they are likely to be out of office, perhaps even
deceased, making it difficult (or impossible) to hold them accounta-
ble. The absence of long-term accountability could result in shirk-
ing, laxity, and an unwarranted focus on the short term. Third is the
apparent fact that synoptic decision making can itself lead to calam-
ity, suggesting perhaps that the sheer intractability of public risk
makes muddling through the lesser of two evils. Robert Dahl seems
to reach this conclusion. He argues against expertise despite the
dangers of bad guesses by ordinary people, comforting himself with
the notion that "the opportunity to make mistakes is the opportunity
to learn."2 7 In the same vein, Ida Hoos, a staunch critic of systems
methodology, reckons that "[m]uddling through is probably safer in
the long run than the wrong cure. "271
From the standpoint of democratic participation in risk manage-
ment, a dilemma arises if views like these are rejected - if incre-
mentalism, after close examination, is revealed as the obvious thing
not to do. Active participation appears to go hand in hand with incre-
mental decision making, suggesting that the two must stand or fall
267 See Diver, supra note 266, at 431.
268 Lowi, DeconstructingAmerican Law (Book Review), 63 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1596
(1985).
269 See, e.g., Lichtenstein, Fischhoff& Phillips, Calibration of Probabilities: The State
of the Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 306,
321-22 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) (finding superb calibration
for weather forecasters' precipitation predictions).
270 R. DAHL, supra note 213, at 51.
271 I. Hoos, supra note 93, at 246.
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together. Muddling through has allowed even the uninformed to
play a role and learn by doing. The method is said to be "basically
democratic." '272 Now, though, it might also prove catastrophic,
something to be borne heavily in mind by those who argue for a
greater public role in the management of modem technology.
The challenge of public risk is to devise solutions as powerful as
the problems they confront, problems that courts and agencies were
hardly designed to solve. We need to imagine institutional break-
throughs that match our technological ones, and we may need a new
politics to replace the old. Tolerant, open-minded, penetrating
argument is an excellent pathway to imagination. In these respects,
though, the current debate about public risk falls short.
272 See W. OPHuLS, supra note 240, at 191-93. Note as well that muddling
through meshes nicely with the democratic case for decentralized decision making:
localities can independently explore different avenues for solving mutual problems,
compare experiences, learn from each other's successes and failures. See supra notes
262 & 263 and accompanying text.
1990] 1109
